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PREFACE
This paper is the principal product of the Photovoltaics Technology
Supply Industry task of the project entitled "Planning and Analysis for
Development of Photovoltaic Energy Conversion System" supported at the
MIT Energy Laboratory by the U.S. Energy Research and Development
Administration (since incorporated in the U.S. Department of Energy). A
second product is "Solar Photovoltaic Technology: Current Processes and
Future Options," D. Bottaro and J. Moskowitz, MIT Energy Laboratory
Working Paper No. MIT-EL 77-041WP, December, 1977. The task ran over the
period from June 1 to August 31, 1977, and the information contained
herein is valid as of that period.
The work reported here is not a completed study. A number of the
important hypotheses need to be clarified and tested. However, because
it is uncertain when the effort on this task will be resumed, the policy
implications of the analysis are presented.
Lawrence H. Linden was the Principal Investigator on this task. The
data-gathering efforts, reported in Chapters Two and Three were the
primary responsibility of Jacob Moskowitz; William C. Ocasio had primary
responsibility for the conceptual framework and analysis reported in
Chapter Four. Drew Bottaro was responsible for the day-to-day management
of the task and the preparation of Chapters Two and Three. The MIT
Photovoltaic Program has been under the overall leadership of David 0.
Wood and Richard D. Tabors.
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A number of individuals in the public and private sectors
contributed their time to interviews; we hereby express our
appreciation. However, the opinions or findings expressed herein are the
responsibility of the authors alone. Neither the MIT Energy Laboratory
nor the U.S. Department of Energy necessarily concur.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The development of new energy technologies is an important public
policy measure which can be undertaken now to aid in the resolution of
future energy problems. In our system of economic organization, the
final development and ultimate entrance of these technologies into the
economic structure of the nation will be managed by private industry.
The performance of thse industries in this task is thus of paramount
public concern. However, our understanding of the process of
technological development in industry is very incomplete, leaving efforts
to facilitate that process without sound guidance. In the U.S. economy,
further confusion arises from the complex role the federal government
plays in affecting private industrial behavior.
This report is the result of a preliminary effort to develop an
understanding of the process of technology development in one particular
industry: that concerned with solar photovoltaics. In the belief that
photovoltaics may be one of the important energy resources of the future,
the federal government has established an aggressive program for its
development. This report was produced to support the government in that
effort; it provides an analysis of the technology development process in
photovoltaics, and information concerning that process, for use by
federal policy-makers. However, the weakness of present knowledge of the
process of technology development implies that this effort is not a
standard application of existing principles to a new situation. It is in
part an effort to develop new principles. As a consequence, the analysis
itself must therefore be somewhat tentative in nature.
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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE
In our mixed economy, private decision-makers (individuals and
firms) make most economic decisions. Any government efforts to affect
the aggregate behavior of a group of firms (an industry) operate in this
context of private decision-making. Therefore, effective and efficient
governmental efforts to influence an industry and the manner in which it
develops a technology must understand the factors that affect that
industry's performance.
While a given technology itself is often the object of analysis, it
is actually the industry employing a given technology which must be the
central focus of policy goals. In this nation almost all goods are
distributed through markets in which voluntary transactions between
buyers and sellers determine the level of economic activity pertaining to
a given product. It is the change in this level of economic activity
which is crucial to the extent to which a new technology will influence
energy problems. Production, distribution, and marketing activity
pertaining to a given product are what is meant by industrial activity,
and those firms engaging in that activity form the industry. Hence it is
the industry which ultimately becomes the object of concern: what
affects its decisions to invest in new production equipment or technology
development, what makes it grow, how it responds to consumer demands,
etc. In short, concern becomes focused upon the industry's performance.
One aspect of the industry's performance relevant to resolving
energy problems is its ability to produce its product in sufficient
quantities to meet demands from users of present energy technology
wishing to switch to the new technology. Factors affecting this ability
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include those which affect industrial capacity and the growth of that
capacity, and understanding them is important. But another aspect of the
industry's performance has a potentially greater impact upon resolution
of energy problems, namely the industry's ability to achieve
technological change in its product or the process for producing it.
Many factors affect technology development; these factors can be divided
crudely into those which affect the production capacity of the industry
(as a function of price) and those which affect the demand for the
industry's products. The interaction of factors of these two types will
affect the level of private interest in the industry and hence the growth
and opportunities for technology development in the industry.
Several factors affect the industry's capability to produce its
goods at a given price in the long run. First, the existence of large
(relative to market size) economies of scale or barriers to entry may
limit the number of firms in the industry. This in turn may increase
price and decrease consumption in the short run and may affect the rate
of technological change and the rate of growth in the long run. Also the
reasons why a firm would want to enter or invest in the industry might
affect the rate of technological change in the industry. For example,
the posture of a firm already utilizing a particular production process
and filling a backlog of orders might differ from that of a firm seeking
to invest in new plant and technology for a new product; the type of
technology in which each firm would be disposed to invest might differ
with respect to the amount of research needed to make the process
commercially feasible and with the likelihood for obtaining substantial
cost reductions in the long run. How firms interact with one another and
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how technology is transferred from firm to firm within and from without
the industry might affect long-run cost reduction. Finally, the
responsiveness of firms to technological change may matter. The ability
of firms to finance large investments in capital equipment (and thus
incorporate new equipment and hence new technology into their production
process) and the adaptability of current production processes to major
technological advances will affect the rate and direction of investment
in technological progress and responsiveness to technological progress
developed externally. Large reductions in costs of alternatives to
present production technology may need to occur before producers risk
investing in new processes.
The willingness of consumers to purchase the industry's products at
a given price is also affected by several factors. Probably the most
important single factor is the price of substitutes for the industry's
products and the rate at which consumers respond to relative price
changes of substitutes, given the lifetime of the capital equipment in
which the substitute technologies are embodied. It could be that only a
drastic relative price change could induce technology-switching by
consumers. Also, consumer receptiveness to a new product may depend upon
uncertainty regarding the performance of the product. Products which are
unproven (or which require long periods of time to prove) might make
consumers question the wisdom of purchasing such products; these
uncertainties could produce uncertainties in overall demand which reduce
private investment in capacity to meet that demand.
Design and management of federal programs to stimulate a particular
industry must consider how the features of supply and demand touched upon
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above interact to affect the industry's present and future performance,
if those programs are to be effective. The combination of technological
possibilities for supplying the industry's products and the potential
demand for those products will determine (in part) the level and type of
investment in the industry, and to a large extent the type of
technological progress which occurs. Policy planning then further
requires an understanding of the responsiveness of industry to efforts
designed to remedy perceived inadequacies in the industry's performance.
How industry's choice of technology will be affected by federally
supported research and development projects and procurements will be
important. These efforts may have short-run effects which differ from
the long-run effects; hence an understanding of both is important.
THE ANALYTICAL APPROACH OF THIS PROJECT
Given the state of knowledge in this area, our goals have been
modest. We do not attempt to explore and explain every facet of the
process of technology development. Rather, we attempt to develop a
simple framework for understanding the various processes in action. The
project whose results are reported here is the first step required in
meeting policy-makers' needs for a more thorough exploration of the topic.
The project involved two facets. While the facets are distinct
conceptually, they proceeded in parallel, and information or concepts
garnered in one facet influenced the progress of the other. One facet
covered the gathering of available information about the options, both
present and possible future, available for photovoltaics and their
production and the participants in the photovoltaic industry. The
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industry was defined broadly to include current and possible future
producers and those firms producing inputs used by producers. Our
information came from technical journals, government reports, the energy
press, and interviews with three firms. The information concerning
photovoltaic technical options is presented fully in a supporting working
paper (Bottaro and Moskowitz, "Solar Photovoltaic Technology: Current
Processes and Future Options") and is summarized in Chapter Two of this
report. The information concerning industrial participants is contained
in Chapter Three. Due to limitations on our own project resources, we
have confined our research and analysis to flat plate collectors, and
specifically have not examined concentrator technology or the potential
for a concentrator industry.
The other facet of the research aimed to develop a qualitative model
of the technology development process in the photovoltaics industry. It
drew upon the evidence portrayed by the first facet to aid in the
development of the qualitative model while simultaneously providing
insights which suggested new avenues of research for the first facet and
frameworks for organizing the data collected. In the second facet energy
markets were analyzed in economic terms, and several of the most
important concepts in the recent technology development literature were
integrated into the economic analysis to illustrate conceptually, and as
applied to photovoltaics, the impact of technological change upon
industrial investment. These results are presented in Chapter Four.
The structure of the report is as follows. Chapter Two begins the
report by presenting a summary of photovoltaic operation, present process
technology and future options for the reader unfamiliar with them. It
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may safely be skipped by the reader aware of the state-of-the-art
possibilities; the reader interested in further detail should see Bottaro
and Moskowitz. In Chapter Three we set forth a brief history of the
photovoltaic industry and its evolution to the present, and discuss in
detail the present and possible future participants in the photovoltaic
industry. Both technology development and production activities are
described. A categorization of firms involved with photovoltaic
technology is set forth; the key behavioral or technological features in
common with each category are presented, as are the differences between
categories. In Chapter Four we then develop a framework for the
development of the photovoltaic market including the evolution of the
product and process technology and the associated institutional
structure. Using several key concepts derived from the literature, we
describe how different types of opportunities for technological change
might affect long-run cost reduction and incentives for investment in the
photovoltaic industry and in the development of new technology. Finally,
in Chapter Five we present some tentative policy implications drawn from
the research to date. They relate to the nature of the changes now
occurring in photovoltaics technology and the government's influence on
those changes, and to the government's relationship with particular
classes of firms and how this may affect the evolution of the industry.
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CHAPTER TWO: PHOTOVOLTAIC PROCESS TECHNOLOGY
To facilitate later discussion of photovoltaic industrial
participants and their activities, and to lay a foundation for discussion
of technology development in photovoltaics, this chapter presents briefly
the very basics of photovoltaic technology and the production processes
for photovoltaics. The material contained herein is presented in greater
detail in a supporting Energy Laboratory working paper (Bottaro and
Moskowitz), and several basic references (Chalmers, Meinel, Adler)
present good summaries of the technology and some of its history. For
ease of reading no references are presented in this simplified discussion
of photovoltaic product and process technology; for the related
references one should consult Bottaro and Moskowitz.
The chapter begins with a presentation of the elements of
photovoltaic operation and design considerations. Following that,
process technologies for silicon photovoltaic cells and for cadmium
sulfide photovoltaic cells are described. These two technologies are the
only two commercial photovoltaic technologies, with silicon in production
and plants for cadmium sulfide nearing completion. Other technologies
currently under development are then briefly described, and at the
chapter's end the key technological choices are summarized.
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I. RUDIMENTS OF OPERATION AND BASIC DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
Photovoltaics convert sunlight to electricity. They are generally
made by placing two oppositely doped1 crystalline structures
(semiconductors) next to one another, forming a cell; one semiconductor
is doped with an excess of electrons while the other has a shortage. The
two semiconductors are joined at what is called the p-n junction. In
simple terms, a photovoltaic cell operates when sunlight hits the cell
and transfers energy to the electrons, enabling them to migrate across
the p-n junction into the other semiconductor. If the two semiconductors
are connected by an external circuit, current will flow so long as the
cell is illuminated. The power produced by a cell under standard noon
sun with standard atmospheric conditions is the peak wattage of the cell
(or series of cells); the cell's output is generally referred to in these
peak watts.
In a typical photovoltaic unit, the cell converts the sunlight to
electricity. It, along with the other cells in its circuit, is placed
onto a substrate. A pottant is then placed on the substrate on top of
the cells, and the entire structure is then covered by the encapsulant
(if the encapsulant and the pottant are different). This encapsulated
structure is called a module. In use, photovoltaic modules are often
used in clusters called arrays; to hold the modules in place requires
some arraying structure for structural support.
Certain design factors affect the output of a photovoltaic unit and
the cost of a unit. The optimal design of unit would be the one which
1Doped crystals contain very small amounts of impurities.
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minimizes the cost per unit of output over the lifetime of the cell,
taking into account the effect upon output and cost of the various design
factors. An increase in output from a particular design modification
does not necessarily imply lower cost per unit output, since costs could
increase more than proportionately with output due to the design
modification. There are three basic types of design modifications
possible: those affecting cell efficiency, those affecting module
efficiency, and those affecting lifetime.
Several factors affect cell efficiency, which is defined as the
fraction of light energy reaching the cell which is converted into
electrical energy. The material forming the semiconductors affects the
cell's efficiency; different materials have different efficiencies in
theory and in practice. The purity and uniformity of crystalline
structure of the material from which the semiconductors are made affects
the extent to which cell efficiency approaches the theoretical limit for
the material; while cells improve in efficiency with increased purity and
increased crystallinity, either of these comes at a cost, and many
promising new techniques involve production of lower-efficiency cells at
greatly reduced cost. Some researchers are even attempting to produce
cells with no crystalline structure (amorphous semiconductors). Other
factors affecting the cell's efficiency include the cell's thickness, its
operating temperature, and the amount of light it reflects (and hence
fails to convert to electricity). All else being equal, cost per unit
output is inversely proportional to efficiency, making efficiency a major
cost-determiner. Also, for applications where weight matters, higher
efficiency implies a higher power-to-weight ratio.
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Module efficiency is defined as the fraction of light energy reaching
the module which is converted into electrical energy. Module efficiency
is affected by the packing ratio of the module, i.e., the ratio of the
surface area of the cells in the module to the module's surface area.
For example, square cells can be packed more tightly than round cells and
modules containing square cells have a higher packing ratio than those
packed with round cells. For a given output, a module with a higher
packing ratio is smaller, permitting savings in module materials and
arraying costs which may offset any increase in costs necessary to
produce the higher packing ratio. Also, the degree to which the
electrical characteristics of the individual cells in the module match
each other affects the module efficiency.
The lifetime of the cells and module also affect output and cost.
The basic determinant of lifetime is the encapsulant's ability to
withstand the environment in which the module is placed.
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II. SILICON PROCESS TECHNOLOGIES
Current production processes for silicon photovoltaic cells may be
broken into five functional stages: mining, materials preparation, cell
blank manufacturing, cell manufacturing, and module manufacturing. The
remainder of this section will explain generally what occurs during each
functional stage and what technological alternatives to current processes
are under research. Figure 2.1 (at the end of section to allow the
reader to fold it out and to refer from text to figure and back) presents
silicon production processes in more detail, showing the options
available at each step. It and the processes it refers to are explained
in much greater detail in Bottaro and Moskowitz. The central line of the
figure, connected by solid arrows, shows present process technology;
dotted lines indicate alternatives under development.
A. MINING
Silicon is mined as silicon dioxide, either in relatively pure form
as quartzite or in less pure form as sand. Most sand and quartzite are
used for construction; some is purified to 96-98% purity silicon of which
most is used by the steel industry. Since the steel industry is largely
unaffected by mineral impurities of several percent, purifiers of silicon
use both sand and quartzite. However, if sufficient quantities of
high-purity silicon were demanded, mining of quartzite specifically for
semiconductor (high-purity) applications might produce cost savings in
subsequent steps.
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B. MATERIALS PREPARATION
To remove the oxygen from the silicon dioxide, the sand or quartzite
is heated in an electric arc furnace, producing metallurgical-grade
silicon of 96-98% purity. This purity is insufficient for making
semiconductors though acceptable for steel production (see above), and
further purification is required (see below). Dow Corning believes its
submerged arc reduction process can be modified to achieve the additional
purification necessary in the initial reduction step.
However, presently available processes must purify the
metallurgical-grade silicon further to produce semiconductor-grade
silicon, which is extremely pure and costly. Three options are available
for achieving the further purification: use of an intermediate compound,
zone refining, and reactive gas blow-through melt purification. Methods
using intermediate compounds, the only ones currently in use, work by
reacting the impure silicon with a reagent (such as chlorine or hydrogen)
which reacts selectively with the silicon but not its impurities. The
reacted silicon (the intermediate compound) is later decomposed into
silicon and the reagent. Zone refining methods work by melting a small
zone in rods of silicon of initially high purity. As the zone is moved,
the silicon recrystallizes, sweeping away impurities and forming a single
crystal. Reactive gas blow-through melt purification is actually the
converse of the intermediate compound method; it operates by bubbling
through the silicon a gas which reacts with the impurities to form
compounds which boil out from the molten silicon.
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C. CELL BLANK MANUFACTURING
After the silicon is purified it is formed into crystals and then cut
into cell blanks. Two basic types of options for crystallization are
available. A crystalline ingot of silicon can be produced using various
techniques. Ingots are monocrystalline in structure; that is, each ingot
is a single crystal. Methods for producing crystalline silicon may also
produce silicon in a form containing many smaller crystals; a crystalline
structure of this form is termed polycrystalline or semicrystalline,
semicrystalline silicon containing larger crystals than polycrystalline.
Photovoltaic cells made from monocrystalline silicon have higher cell
efficiencies than cells made from polycrystalline or semicrystalline
silicon; the monocrystalline silicon, however, costs more. The other
type of option involves producing silicon crystals using non-ingot
technologies. Non-ingot technologies produce silicon of various degrees
of crystallinity, usually in ribbon or sheet form.
Ingot technologies include the standard Czochralski technique, the
only process currently in production. In this technique a round seed
crystal is placed into a crucible of highly pure molten silicon and
slowly withdrawn; the molten silicon crystallizes on the crystal being
withdrawn. Another ingot technique, zone refining, is discussed in
Section B above. A third technique, the heat exchanger method,
involves cooling the molten silicon in the crucible from the center
outward. This has the potential advantages of producing larger crystals
in the shape of the crucible (thus permitting square crystals and high
packing factors) and of using lower-purity silicon initially, since zone
refining apparently occurs at the solid/liquid interface.
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Non-ingot technologies include several largely unrelated process
possibilities. Ribbon technologies, such as Mobil-Tyco's edge-defined
film growth (EFG) method and the dendritic web method, produce
monocrystalline silicon (or nearly so) from molten silicon in thin
ribbons, thus facilitating cell manufacturing (see below). Sheet
technologies, such as Solarex's cast silicon process, peeled film
technology, or chemical vapor deposition, produce a sheet of silicon
which is not monocrystalline but polycrystalline or semicrystalline (and
therefore lower efficiency). Sheet technologies have the potential for
great cost-savings because they facilitate cell manufacturing and because
they may be able to use 'solar grade' silicon, i.e., silicon purer than
metallurgical-grade silicon but not as pure as (and not nearly so costly
as) semiconductor-grade silicon. Finally, recent breakthroughs in the
understanding of the operation of amorphous semiconductors make them a
possibility. These semiconductors use inexpensive glasses rather than
silicon of some level of purity and offer potential for radical cost
reductions.
Once the silicon has been crystallized it must be cut into cell
blanks for further processing. For ingot technologies cell blanks are
created by slicing the ingot; during the slicing much silicon dust is
produced which goes to waste. Research efforts here have been aimed at
minimizing this waste and at producing thinner cells, thereby getting
more wafers (cell blanks) from each ingot. Non-ingot technologies have
the possibility of using simpler and inherently less wasteful techniques
such as scribing the ribbon or sheet.
15
D. CELL MANUFACTURING
In this functional stage the cell blank is made into a photovoltaic
cell, capable of producing electricity from sunlight. Current processes
perform four basic operations upon the cell blank. The blank is first
etched (roughened) to reduce reflectivity and thus improve efficiency.
Next a p-n junction is formed from the topmost layer of this blank by
diffusing into the silicon small quantities of impurities. (Different
methods of junction formation are under research.) After the blank has
become a semiconductor, a metal grid is attached to the top of the
semiconductor to conduct electrons to the external circuit.
Photolithography has been used, but screen printing appears to be precise
enough for photovoltaic cells. Finally, an antireflective coating is put
onto the metallized semiconductor's surface, completing the cell.
Non-ingot technologies permit drastic automation of the above steps.
Currently these steps are done one at a time, and much labor is used to
move the cell blanks through the steps. However, non-ingot technologies
may permit the use of continuous processes rather than the current batch
processes (see Figure 2.1). In these processes the ribbon or sheet would
proceed from cell blank manufacture directly through cell manufacture.
E. MODULE MANUFACTURING
After cell manufacturing is completed, the electrical characteris-
tics of the completed cells are measured. Thoe whose characteristics are
similar are placed in a module and soldered together in series to form a
string. The string is then covered with a pottant such as RTV which in
turn may be covered by glass or lexan to increase durability.
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III. CADMIUM SULFIDE PROCESS TECHNOLOGY
Current cadmium sulfide process technologies are designed to produce
photovoltaic cells from polycrystalline cadmium sulfide. Using
polycrystalline cadmium sulfide allows the use of thin-film deposition
techniques; these techniques permit flexibility in sequencing process
steps. Cadmium sulfide photovoltaic production may be broken into five
functional steps: raw material production, encapsulation, active layer
formation, junction formation, and metallization. Due to the inherent
flexibility of the process, the last three steps may occur in reverse
order, and encapsulation occurs throughout the process.
Cadmium sulfide is mined as ore (greenockite); it is a by-product of
zinc production and is used mainly as a pigment. The production process
can be started from the cadmium sulfide directly or from elemental cadmium
Once the starting material is selected and purified sufficiently,
production may begin without prior crystallization, unlike silicon
processes. Early stages of encapsulation initiate the process. Current
plans are for a hermetically sealed encapsulation of the cadmium sulfide
cells to exclude all moisture and oxygen from the cells since cadmium
sulfide cells degrade irreversibly in the presence of oxygen (either free
or in water). The encapsulation would then consist of a metal substrate
with a glass cover sealed to the substrate. The encapsulation process
may begin with either the metal substrate or the glass; for simplicity we
assume in the brief exposition below that it begins with the substrate.
If it begins with the glass, the remaining three steps occur in reverse
order from what follows, with the initial step being metallization onto
hot glass.
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Cell manufacturing begins by depositing a thin film of cadmium
sulfide onto the substrate, usually by deposition in a vacuum but
sometimes by sintering cadmium sulfide powder to the substrate. The
cadmium sulfide layer may be deposited selectively upon the substrate,
thereby creating several cell areas at once. Next, the p-n junction is
formed by producing a thin layer of copper sulfide on the cadmium
sulfide, either by dipping the substrate in copper sulfate or by spraying
on a thin layer of copper sulfide. Finally, the cells are completed by
the spraying of a transparent metallization layer or by the
screenprinting of a copper metallization grid. Encapsulation is then
completed by soldering the glass cover to the substrate and cell
assembly, producing the finished module.
As the above description indicates, cadmium sulfide process
technology is oriented toward chemical processes, as contrasted with
current silicon technology, which is more physically oriented. Chemical
process technology is probably a necessity for any thin film approach and
is sufficient for realizing the potential for large cost reductions
associated with sheet technologies. Thus, current cadmium sulfide
process technology reflects features being sought by research on advanced
silicon process technology.
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IV. OTHER TECHNOLOGIES
Other technologies for photovoltaics differ from silicon and cadmium
sulfide technologies in at least one of two ways: either the material
from which the cells are made is different, or the nature of the p-n
junction is different. While none of these technologies is available
outside the research laboratory, their existence indicates that many
opportunities for changing the design of photovoltaics exist which differ
from present commercial technologies in many basic respects.
Of the many materials under research, gallium arsenide is
particularly interesting because of its high efficiency which stays high
at elevated temperatures. These characteristics suit gallium arsenide
cells well to use in concentrator systems. Other materials under
research include germanium, selenium, indium phosphide, copper sulfide,
zinc sulfide, cadmium telluride, and indium selenide.
The p-n junction can differ from the standard model if it is created
by the joining of two different materials. Such a junction is called a
heterojunction; cadium sulfide cells use such a junction as they are
formed by thin layers of cadmium sulfide and copper sulfide. Some
research in progress includes joining a semiconductor material directly
to metal. Other types of research in progress on the p-n junction
include efforts to produce multiple junctions in the cells so that a
greater fraction of the light reaching the cell is converted to
electricity.
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V. SUMMARY
As the above discussion shows, many options for technological advance
exist in photovoltaics. These options may be summarized as follows,
organized according to the degree by which they differ from the current
approach:
1. Options for Monocrystalline Silicon Ingot Technologies
These technologies may be improved in several ways. First, methods
for purifying the silicon may be improved, possibly eliminating one or
more process steps. Second, better methods of making the silicon ingot
are under research; these methods may permit the use of lower purity
starting silicon than is now required. Third, the p-n junction may be
modified to increase cell efficiency. Fourth, slicing techniques with
higher yields may be developed.
2. Options for Non-ingot Silicon Technologies
Several different options exist for producing photovoltaics from
silicon without using ingots. The essence of these options is a change
in the way in which the silicon is crystallized. Monocrystalline ribbons
are one possibility, and polycrystalline or semicrystalline sheet silicon
is another. The latter may also be able to use lower purity silicon than
is required for monocrystalline silicon. In addition to simplifying the
cell blank manufacturing stage, these options can be used in continuous
production processes, thereby facilitating cell and module manufacturing.
3. Advanced and Novel Materials Options
These options involve materials other than silicon, such as cadmium
sulfide and gallium arsenide, and frequently involve heterojunctions.
Many of the process technologies for producing photovoltaics from novel
materials are non-ingot, including especially thin-film sheet technology,
which is used to produce cadmium sulfide cells.
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CHAPTER THREE: PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS
I. HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT OF PHOTOVOLTAICS AND PHOTOVOLTAIC
PRODUCTION
Having previewed photovoltaic process technology in Chapter Two, we
now proceed to discuss participants in the current photovoltaic industry
and how the industry has reached its present state. This chapter opens
with a brief historical summary intended to show the evolution of the
technology in modern times and the concomitant industrial developments;
the significance of this history will be explored further in Chapter
Four. Following the historical summary is a discussion of current
photovoltaic industry participants; these participants are grouped into
several categories (explained below in Section II of this chapter) to aid
analysis of the industry. Some broad comparisons of activities of firms
by category conclude the chapter.
A. PHOTOVOLTAICS: DEVELOPMENT AND EARLY INDUSTRY
While the photovoltaic effect has been known to exist since
Becquerel discovered it in 1839, it was not well understood until the
mid-20th century, and efficiencies remained below 1%. With further
understanding of the p-n junction and with the development of the
transistor, efficiencies increased, and in 1954 Bell Laboratories
invented the modern silicon solar cell. At this time research was
continuing on other materials such as cadmium sulfide, cadmium telluride,
gallium arsenide, copper oxide (Cu2O), and selenium, with production
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runs being made on some (Wolf, 1972, pp. 120, 121).
With the developments at Bell Laboratories came early industrial
efforts. A large terrestrial market was perceived, and development of
certain applications was attempted. Two companies, Hoffman Semiconductor
(later Centralab, still later, OCLI) and International Rectifier, opened
production lines for silicon cells in 1956. However, the terrestrial
market did not develop, although some photovoltaics were used for remote
telemetry repeater stations in Japan as early as 1958 (Rosenblatt, p.
104). Nonterrestrial markets were not foreseen (Wolf, 1972, pp. 121,
123).
B. THE SPACE PROGRAM
As the space program developed through the late 1950s, the need for
photovoltaics for space applications grew. For the space program, the
ideal photovoltaic would have high efficiency, high power-to-weight
ratio, and high reliability. These requirements suggest a
monocrystalline wafer cut to allow close packing in the module, thus
achieving a high packing factor and high module efficiency. Cell cost
was not very important, since the major cost was placing the additional
weight into orbit. Of the technologies then available, silicon best fit
the desired characteristics. Because of ths fit, starting in the late
1950s a demand for silicon cells designed especially for the space
program arose (Wolf, 1972, pp. 119, 120).
Production of silicon cells quickly rose to 10 kW/yr, salvaging the
young photovoltaic industry. The two original entrants continued in
business while Heliotek (later Spectrolab), RCA, and Texas Instruments
24
entered the silicon photovoltaic field. Through the 1960s demand rose to
a peak of about 70 kW/yr and then remained at that level; meanwhile, from
1964 through 1968, three of the five silicon photovoltaic manufacturers
left the industry, leaving only Centralab and Heliotek (Wolf, 1972, pp.
120, 121).
While silicon cells were being produced for the space program,
research continued upon other promising materials, including cadmium
sulfide (see Shirland). Research in cadmium sulfide cells began in 1954
at Air Force Laboratories and Harshaw Chemical Company (now a division of
Kewanee Oil) and continued at Clevite (now part of Gould), Eagle-Picher,
and RCA (Shirland, pp. 44, 48 in Backus). Since no terrestrial market of
any size existed, few sales occurred except those to the space program.
Hence, due to the presence of a market for photovoltaics for space
applications and the absence of one for terrestrial applications, most
photovoltaics sold through 1972 used silicon cells and were designed for
space applications.
C. GROWTH OF THE TERRESTRIAL MARKET
While some terrestrial applications for remote telemetry repeaters
existed as early as 1958, 1972 marked the first year in which
photovoltaics were produced specifically for the terrestrial market, when
Solar Power Corp. and Solarex began operations (Inform, pp. 132, 133).
Modules produced for the terrestrial market did not need the close
packing, high efficiency, high reliability, or radiation hardening
required for space applications. Costs per peak kilowatt were therefore
considerably lower than for space modules, but costs per kilowatt-hour
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were still considerably higher than the cost of power from electric
utilities. Terrestrial applications to date have been in remote
locations where connection to the grid was costly or impractical and the
cost of transporting on-site generating equipment, petroleum products, or
batteries is high.
One of the first applications was the mountaintop radio repeater.
Prior methods of powering these repeaters used petroleum-fueled (usually
diesel) or natural gas-fueled mechanical or thermoelectric generators and
rechargeable or primary batteries. All of these methods required several
visits yearly to the site by a technician to change batteries or to
supply fuel. Solar Power Corporation claims that the initial $2,000
average incremental expenditure for a photovoltaic-powered mountaintop
repeater repays itself in two to three years, considering the costs of
transporting fuel and personnel to maintain the site otherwise (SPC, p.
2).
Navigational aids on buoys or oil platforms employing lights and
horns as signalling devices have also formed a part of the market. The
Coast Guard expects to have 20 photovoltaic-powered buoys and 30 fixed
navigation markers off the South Florida coast this year (SEIR, December
6, 1976).
Solar Power Corporation considers railroad crossing signals to be a
large future market and notes that there are 180,000 such unmarked
crossings in the United States (INFORM, p. 112). Warning signs for
highways are being explored by ERDA in an Arizona installation that until
now has relied on propane-fueled 60-watt generators, cutting annual
operating costs in half to $12,000 (Electronics, June 9, 1977). Highway
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call boxes using solar cells were installed in California as early as
19/4 (Rosenblatt).
Some other present markets sharing the need for electric power in a
remote location are TV and radio service to primitive African villages;
cathodic protection for iron pipes, bridges, and other structures; crop
irrigation; and novelty items (toys, watches requiring little power).
Battery trickle-chargers for boats have been offered as a consumer item
but have not sold well (Addiss).
Recently a nonmarket source of demand has developed. In 1976, Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) began its Large-scale Procurement Task, part
of the Low-cost Silicon Solar Array (LSSA) Project which JPL operates
under contract from ERDA. The two "buys" which have occurred so far have
been for 46 kW and 125 kW, with bids for a 200 kW "add-on" to the second
buy submitted. Results of the first two buys are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
THROUGH LARGE SCALE PROCUREMENT TASK
SuccesstuI
Bidders
Solar Power Corp.
Sensor Technology
Spectrolab
M-7 International
Solarex
First buy: First
Quarter 1976
Price Quantity
(Current$i
13.69/W 15kW
20.06/W 8kW
25.20/W 10kW
27.96/W 3kW
28.93/W 10kW
Secona uy: inlrd
Quarter 1976
Price Quantity
Current
$)
23.28/W 15kW
12.80/W 40kW
17.55/W 40kW
19.76/W 30kW
All watt figures are in
Source: Jet Propulsion
peak units.
Laboratory
PURCHASES
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II. CURRENT INDUSTRY
Involvement in the photovoltaic industry today takes one of several
forms. Some firms manufacture photovoltaics; others perform research on
various aspects of photovoltaic technology or production technolgy; some
do both. Involvement by some firms is tentative, while others have
committed or plan to commit large amounts of resources to photovoltaic
research or manufacture.
In order to describe the industry we have organized the firms
exhibiting these various kinds and degrees of activity in the
photovoltaic industry into several categories. The categories depend
upon the activity of the firm or its parent. That activity's
relationship to present and possible future production of photovoltaics
suggests possible economic motivations for firms in that category to
commit resources to the photovoltaic industry; these motivations, and
other comments, are discussed for each category of firms. Table 3.2
previews the categories, each of which is discussed in the text in its
own section.
Table 3.2
CATEGORIES OF PHOTOVOLTAIC INDUSTRY PARTICIPANTS
1. Terrestrial photovoltaics manufacturers
2. Space photovoltaics manufacturers
3. Materials manufacturers
4. Semiconductor firms
5. Oil companies
6. Electrical equipment manufacturers
7. Research firms and others
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Within each section the firms which the category comprises will be
discussed. Some firms arguably fall under more than one category; when
appropriate, the firm will be discussed under both categories. Also, our
ability to classify particular firms is limited by our not having
interviewed very many of them. To the extent that this limitation
results in misclassification of a particular firm, the analysis drawn as
it applies to that firm may be off the mark. However, we maintain that
our analysis as it pertains to the categories of firms remains valid even
if the application to a particular firm is in dispute.
Much of the data about the individual firms within each category is
summarized in the tables which follow, presenting:
1. Each firm in the category in alphabetical order.
2. The firm's photovoltaic technologies, including both
technologies used for production and technologies under
research.
3. The development stage of the technologies. We use five
development stages: research, initial development, final
development, introduction, and production. These stages
closely resemble others used elsewhere (see, for example, MIT
Energy Laboratory, pp. 41 et seq., and ERDA 76-1, vol. I, p.
56). Here they serve to in-icate the nearness of the
technology to production and the orientation of the firm's
activity toward the technology.
4. Federal support for each technology, ranging from "None" to
"All". If more specific information, such as percent of
funding which is federal, is available, it is given; a question
mark following the entry indicates uncertainty about the
correctness of the entry, and a "Yes" indicates uncertainty
whether internal funds are also used.
5. Comments, if any.
Our categories of development stages are worth amplifying further.
In general, as a technology proceeds from research to production the
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details of how it can best be utilized are worked out and transformed
from concepts to physical facilities through the directed efforts of the
firm involved. In research, initial development and final development
R&D efforts are aimed at gaining technical knowledge; in general, no
sales of actual products are made. In the research stage, efforts aim
toward understanding the technology's underlying processes, while in the
initial development and final development stages, firms direct their
attention toward applying the knowledge gained from research to
production. Initial development and final development differ in the
number of significant research steps or hurdles remaining to completion;
note that this distinction does not include a time element, since the
last hurdle for one technology may never be crossed while the last ten
for another technology may be crossed rapidly. The number of steps
remaining, not the time remaining, forms the basis for distinction.
Production involves a market transaction for the product. Firms in the
intervening stage (introduction) utilize pilot plants, test sales, etc.
to introduce the new technology into the market. (A much more detailed
description is given in MIT Energy Laboratory.)
The information presented in the tables provides part of the basis
for discussing the activities within each category of firms; the rest of
the basis follows from Chapter Two or appears directly in the text.
A. TERRESTRIAL PHOTOVOLTAICS MANUFACTURERS
Members of this category include those firms whose production is, to
our knowledge, principally directed toward production of photovoltaics
for the terrestrial market. Firms not yet producing for immediate profit
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are excluded. Some firms in this class produce space cells, and space
cell manufacturers produce for the terrestrial market, so the cleavage
between this category and the following is not clean. Also, one member
of this category, Solar Power Corporation, is an oil company subsidiary,
and will also be included under oil companies; it is included here to
show the similarity of its activities to the other terrestrial cell
manufacturers.
Firms in this category address their activities directly to today's
terrestrial market which consists of remote applications of
photovoltaics. Their interests lie in developing the current and
near-term markets for terrestrial photovoltaics, and their technology and
marketing operations are addressed to the needs and scale of those
markets.
As shown in Table 3.3, all firms in this category use
monocrystalline silicon cells in their modules. Some buy ingots and cut
wafers from them, while others buy wafers directly. Modules are
assembled largely by hand from cells also manufactured largely by hand.
Several manufacturers in this category see cost reduction occurring
through production and further refinement of the Czochralski process
(Lindmayer, 1975, pp. 2373-79; Rubin; Yerkes). We think, however, that
the Czochralski process has only a limited potential for cost reduction,
and at some rate of production other technologies will dominate. (When
or whether this rate will be reached we do not guess.)
Even if breakthroughs do occur with some of the more promising
technologies such as EFG, one manufacturer suggests that it would license
or purchase whatever it needed to continue production (Yerkes). This
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possibility may suggest a break in the vertical structure of the
industry, with those experienced in assembly, arraying, and marketing
purchasing crystalline silicon from others (Yerkes).
Firms in this category, with one exception, are privately held;
hence they do not have access to large amounts of a parent corporation's
capital.1 Their internally funded research therefore tends to be
shorter-range in nature and usually is closely tied to current production
processes or the next foreseen improvements. Table 3.3 shows that all
but one have received federal support through the Large Scale Procurement
Task, Spectrolab being the only solvent nonterrestrial manufacturer also
to receive similar support (see Table 3.1 above). Also,
production-related R&D has also received federal R&D support.
Interestingly, the research which these firms have undertaken on advanced
and polycrystalline materials has not received federal support but has
proceeded with internal funds.
Firms without immediate access to large sources of capital sometimes
obtain needed capital by affiliating with larger companies. All firms in
this category except Solar Power Corporation share this possibility.
However, the initial formation of these firms seems to have taken place
as spin-offs from larger firms. Three firms were founded by photovoltaic
experts who left other companies. Joseph Lindmayer, formerly director of
Comsat's Solid State Research Lab where he performed research on space
cells, left Comsat in 1973 to form Solarex, now one of the largest solar
1Even the exception, Solar Power Corporation, behaves largely as
though it were unaffiliated. Its activities, particularly R&D, are tied
to its production activities; Exxon Research and Engineering performs the
longer-range research for Exxon (Addiss).
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cell manufacturers. William Yerkes, founder of Spectrolab, left when
Hughes bought it in 1975 and founded Solar Technology. Rubin, co-founder
of Sensor Technology, was in charge of space cell manufacture at Hoffman
Semiconductor, then at International Rectifier. In 1966 he left to found
Sensor Technology. In fact, the possibility of affiliating with larger
companies may have motivated the formation of several of these firms. In
Section E below we note several instances in which smaller companies have
affiliated with larger companies.
B. SPACE PHOTOVOLTAICS MANUFACTURERS
This category comprises manufacturers whose photovoltaic efforts
have been directed primarily toward production of modules for use in
space. The relatedness of their product to that sold in the terrestrial
market motivates their participation in the terrestrial market.
While the technology is quite similar, differences exist. Space
cells must be of higher quality than terrestrial cells, and would not
contain solar-grade silicon. Photolithography will probably not be
replaced by screen-printed metallization. Diffused layers above the
junction must be thinner to increase sensitivity to ultraviolet light.
Lastly, the cost of putting any weight into orbit requires high packing
ratios.
Such cells produce modules higher in price than terrestrial ones,
although superior in many ways. However, the superiorities gain the
modules no cost-effective advantages in the terrestrial market.
Space cell manufacturers grow their own silicon crystals because
they must meet traceability requirements for space and military
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customers, making them more highly integrated than terrestrial
manufacturers.
Both surviving space cell manufacturers bid in the Large Scale
Procurement Task, with one's bid being accepted. Other federal support
of these firms for research has addressed mass production techniques,
high-efficiency cells, and advanced material research. Little internally
funded research appears to be ongoing, even though both manufacturers are
owned by, or are part of, larger firms. (See Table 3.4.)
C. MATERIALS MANUFACTURERS
The firms falling within this category manufacture or prepare
materials which are or might be used to produce photovoltaics. Their
interests follow from the possibility of high growth of the photovoltaic
industry, thus producing an increased demand for their products, which
range from silicon material to AR coatings to glass substrates for CdS
cells.
These firms face uncertainties in the size of the market for their
products in the photovoltaic industry for two reasons. First, the rate
of the photovoltaic industry's growth is uncertain, thereby making the
potential market for materials products as a function of price also
uncertain. Second, the cost of photovoltaics is also uncertain, making
the market equilibrium uncertain even if the demand curves for the
materials products are known. Furthermore, if large cost reductions
obtain, the technology which will be used to achieve such cost reductions
cannot safely be predicted, and long-range technologies vary considerably
in some of their components; therefore, a product currently a component
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may not be so in the long run. Also, since the total cost reduction
depends upon the reduction of component costs, the degree of uncertainty
in total cost reduction depends upon the degree of uncertainty in
reducing the costs of the materials manufacturer's own product and varies
with the product, being in our opinion greatest with silicon
purification, crystallization, and cell blank manufacturing.
We venture no hypotheses as to the effects of these simultaneous
uncertainties upon the privately funded R&D activities of these
manufacturers. However, Table 3.5 shows that the bulk of
Czochralski-related R&D has received federal support while ribbon and CdS
R&D have been privately supported. Also, one manufacturer, Libbey-Owens,
owns a minority interest in Photon Power, a corporation planning
production of cadmium sulfide cells.
D. SEMICONDUCTOR FIRMS
This category comprises firms who make semiconductors, generally for
inclusion in their own products. Since photovoltaic cells are
semiconductors, the interests of these firms in photovoltaics derive from
the possibility of a new and growing market for one of their products.
Arguably, then, this category falls within the preceding category of
materials maufacturers; however, the process for manufacturing
semiconductors has several important steps in common with photovoltaic
manufacture, and hence we treat semiconductor firms separately.
The steps in photovoltaic manufacture from crystal growth and
slicing through metallization correspond to similar steps in
semiconductor manufacture. To the extent that the experience gained in
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the semiconductor industry on these steps can be applied to photovoltaic
manufacture, it will benefit semiconductor firms entering the flat-plate
photovoltaic industry and provide an incentive for them to do so.
However, several factors suggest that this experience will not prove
highly useful, and that the production processes for photovoltaics and
for other semiconductors are diverging, not converging.
i. Mass production techniques in the semiconductor industry do not
require large throughput of wafers, since each wafer can produce chips
for hundreds of devices, whereas the photovoltaic industry clearly
requires automatic handling of large areas of silicon.1 Thus, much of
this automation in the present semiconductor field is in processes that
are irrelevant to solar cell manufacture, e.g., dice slicing, multiple
photolithography and etching steps, tiny epoxy packaging, dice (chip)
handling, etc. (Lyman). For example, while the semiconductor device
manufacturers are contemplating the switch to electrolithography because
the light beam wavelengths (.0004 mm) used in conventional
photolithography have become too blunt an instrument for future progress
(Electronics, May 12, 1977, pp. 90-98), photovoltaic manufacturers are
changing over from photolithography to screen printing, a less precise
but cheaper method of metallization.
2. The direction of development in the semiconductor industry has
been toward developing highly articulated structures for integrated
circuits, a direction which probably will produce nothing of value for
photovoltaics and actually results in the handling of smaller silicon
chips, therefore separating the process even further from photovoltaic
manufacture.
3. Since the cost of the silicon has been a small part of the
semiconductor's cost, cost-reduction efforts in the semiconductor
industry have not been aimed at the silicon itself; the opposite is
necessary in photovoltaics.
4. Since the semiconductor industry requires high-purity
monocrystalline silicon, it has no experience with solar-grade silicon,
thin film materials, or other novel technologies (many of which are
"chemistry-based") which show possibilities for cost reduction of flat
plate technology in the long run.
1In fact, one manufacturer of photovoltaics (Solarex) claims that
it currently handles as many silicon wafers as the big semiconductor
companies (Lindmayer, 1977).
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Thus, conveniently similar technology is the tie of the semiconductor
firms to photovoltaics, but that technology may be precisely the obstacle
to long-run commercialization of flat-plate photovoltaics.
Table 3.6 shows the activities of semiconductor firms. The two
firms close to production have reached that state with little or no
federal support, while the remaining firms are developing production
techniques with federal support. Each of the major semiconductor firms
(RCA, Texas Instruments, Motorola) received more than $1,000,000 in ERDA
research money in 1976 (ERDA 76-161, pp. 8-16) while in the same year all
oil companies combined received less than $700,000. Also, some activity
appears concerning advanced and novel techniques, and it has partial
federal funding.
Several of the semiconductor firms were involved in the initial
space market, as set forth in Section I.B above. It is not known whether
the size of the early market led to the withdrawal from the market by
several of the firms; however, small market size may be inhibiting entry
of some semiconductor firms.1 These firms may be waiting until the
price of photovoltaics drops to a point at which a larger market,
different in kind from the current remote terrestrial market, opens.
(For further discussion of the possibilities of segmentation of the
photovoltaics market, see Chapter Four, Section IV below.) Also,
semiconductor firms face a steadily growing market for their product
(unlike oil companies -- see Section E below) and do not "need" to
diversify in order to protect their industrial position.
1According to Gene Wakefield of Texas Instruments: "Terrestrial
solar cells are not a near term business of any magnitude; no major
company is going to spend its time for peanuts." (INFORM, p. 137).
40
, r-l
> cn.C0) 'H a 
O k ~?
, C --I H0o 0 )
a) H C) 
0 d Cd
0) 0 0 4J
3) -H a) 0
P4 <rr 4-4C)
a)
0Z
O
'H
4-J
C)
10
,-d3H
I.,
v
(-1
00
O
a)
CdP
M 4
o c
a)t
CO
o a)
Um >
U 4J 4
,, a, a a
· H H H
co 4,3 4,3 .
o 0or o.0a oO O O · ,. · ,
V) C Qc QH 'H 'HC ()
*. 'H *H1 a) 
a) a)
'l 'H *H ,1 '
4- U X D 
O
o O O U U
C)
a)
Cd
U H
4 4
H t
¢)(da)a)
a) -
6 4,3
0H 0
·H 0) H H
O 0 40
) H C)V 4
Q ~ Or. ,--- 0-4CO O O rl
a) 0(0 - 'H 
cJ t1dQ C/cod
¢
-1
a)
u
C1) 
C )
Cd P
uu
P wd
a) 4-
0 Cd
PZ4 r-
a1)l)
Lo 
Ca)Cd,
w O4-i
C)
Cd
C ed
r.e 
a)
0z
I
C)
0 >
C
0 U
¢ O
P44-3
r H oH r1 
OE-o
PI
P4Fj
cn
0a
C:DH
E-4
CX
E-4z
0
Pq
01-4
0a
0z
u
H4
E-4
H
.Ho 
W EE- {
C(D
U 4
a) a)
o o
a) a)
a) a)
U H
Cd CdH H
a) a)
O rl O 'H
H C 1 C)
o0 0
H o4 H ,--
H O H C)
0 (0
0 co H t
CO d O C
a)
0
U
CO
H
ECd -0)H
I
I
i
I
I
I
II
i
fH
E. OIL COMPANIES
Subsidiaries or divisions of oil companies fall within this
category. Generally efforts here involve a separate corporation owned at
least 50%, and perhaps entirely, by an oil company. In 1970, Exxon
founded and continues to fund Solar Power Corp., which makes cells based
on current wafer technology. Mobil Oil has provided all of the funding
required ($2,000,000) to launch and maintain Mobil-Tyco Solar Energy
Corporation and expects to have $30,000,000 invested in Mobil-Tyco by
1982 (Inform, p. 120). Shell Oil started SES, Inc., a prospective
cadmium sulfide solar cell manufacturer, with a $3,000,000 stock purchase
in 1973 (40%). It recently acquired another 40% with a $3,600,000
investment. Compagnie Francaise des Petroles, France's largest company
and one of the world's largest oil companies, acquired 90% of Photon
Power in December, 1976, and plans to have over $2,000,000 invested by
June, 1978 (Wall Street Journal, December 29, 1976, p. 4). It
subsequently resold 39% to Libbey-Owens, retaining majority ownership for
itself.
Oil companies operate in an era in which the price of their primary
product has risen and reserves of it are depleting, thus providing
increasing incentives for consumers to find substitutes for oil. They
have been performing research upon and investing in non-oil energy
sources; some of these sources have production processes related to oil
production, while others do not. Oil companies have expertise in
applications of many chemistry-based techniques. This expertise may be
of use in developing and producing photovoltaics which use thin-film
processes, and may explain why the only two domestic efforts toward
42
production of cadmium sulfide photovoltaics come from oil company
subsidiaries.
Some of the energy efforts of oil companies seem aimed at close
substitutes for oil (generally other fossil fuels), while others, such as
photovoltaics (and also nuclear, geothermal and others) seem aimed at
less substitutable energy sources. At some point production of oil will
peak and then decline. When this occurs, oil companies will have
tremendous financial resources for moving into other energy areas. By
expanding into other energy markets these firms will be able to maintain
their relative size and importance within the industrial sector.
Because of the situation described above facing the oil companies,
oil company efforts in development of new energy technologies may be
riskier than efforts of other firms. Efforts by oil companies in new
energy technologies might be more important to the oil companies'
maintaining relative size and industrial status than such efforts would
be to other companies since new energy technologies are substitutes in
part or in whole for existing products of oil companies rather than mere
additions to product lines of other firms. Failure to invest in
potential substitutes for existing products may have graver consequences
for a firm than failure to add new products when markets for existing
products are stable or growing; hence an oil company may be less bothered
by the degree of technological uncertainty associated with a new energy
technology and hence more willing to risk an investment.
Oil company efforts with photovoltaics have been largely
production-oriented, as shown in Table 3.7; the production-oriented
efforts have received little federal support. Some federal support has
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been received for EFG and organic photovoltaics. While federal support
has been by and large refused, one should note the size of the private
investments contemplated, as shown under "Comments" in Table 3.7. These
can be compared with the projected federal budget for photovoltaics for
FY 78 of $57 million.
Some federal concern exists about the horizontal spread of oil
companies into non-oil energy markets. The Federal Trade Commission has
undertaken a study of possible anticompetitive aspects of the
photovoltaic industry, and plans a conference later this year on the
industry's structure, concerning (inter alia) the ability of oil
companies to achieve a technological breakthrough which will allow them
to corner the market (Solar Outlook, July 11, 1977). Also, federal
horizontal divestiture legislation has been proposed which would inhibit
oil company involvement in non-oil energy production.
F. ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS
Firms here produce central power stations and related distribution,
conversion, and utilization equipment. One (General Electric) also makes
large power semiconductors used for controlling and switching electric
power in heavy power-handling equipment.
To some extent, photovoltaics complement some of the products these
manufacturers produce which consume electricity.1 Any technology which
could lower the cost of electricity for some applications would increase
the demand for products used in those applications and could create a
demand for new products.
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Westinghouse and General Electric also make central power generation
equipment for which photovoltaics may substitute in part at some time
(see Table 3.8). Both have conducted federally supported studies of the
use of photovoltaics for central power generation. The existence of
competitively priced photovoltaic central power generation equipment
could affect the demand for other types of central power generation
equipment and may be one reason for the two firms' interest in
photovoltaic central power generation. Thus their work on photovoltaics,
like their work on other new electric power generation technologies,
seems aimed at preserving their role in this market.
Other than central power system studies and McGraw-Edison's small
production line, efforts have covered federally supported studies of
advanced silicon technologies and privately supported cadmium sulfide
studies.
G. RESEARCH FIRMS AND OTHERS
Many of the remaining firms involved in photovoltaics are research
firms, as Table 3.9 shows. Some perform studies under federal contract;
their product is the research and and their customer the federal
government. Others perform research with internally generated funds.
This latter group of research firms performs research with a view to
marketing it. Their research is their final product, and their market
the private sector. Firms in this group generally have large research
1G.E., the largest manufacturer of electrical equipment, makes no
secret that one of its motivations in investing in photovoltaic is to
help establish electricity as the universal energy "currency" and hence
maximize the role of electricity in U.S. energy consumption.
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facilities, and patents sometimes are by-products of other research aimed
at development of other products. Generally federal support is refused
so that the firm may retain private ownership of the patents. These
patents serve as inputs to the photovoltaic industry and
revenue-producing products of the research industry.1 .
A few firms in this category do not fall neatly into either group of
research firms. Some may have an interest in a specialized market such
as Comsat may have for photovoltaics for communications satellites;
others may have interests in a long-range, low-probability market
developing. One (Energy Conversion Devices) may properly be said to have
commercial intentions; however, we know little of its activities except
that production is not imminent.
H. SUMMARY
Table 3.10 summarizes the production and R&D activities for the
seven categories of firms discussed above. The table is broken down by
category of firm and by the type of industrial activity, ranging from
production using available techniques through R&D activities aimed at
technologies quite different from the present. For each entry on the
tables the qualitative fraction of firms pursuing the activity is
indicated (all, most, some, none), followed by the degree of federal
1Legal restrictions may limit the profitability of the research
products. In particular, a court decision forced Bell Labs to make the
original silicon solar cell patent generally available without cost
(Inform, p. 106), and AT&T is legally prohibited from manufacturing and
marketing equipment not directly concerned with communications.
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support for those firms pursuing the activity. Uncertainty in the
correctness of an entry is indicated by a question mark following the
entry, and qualifications are included in the entry.
In this table we can clearly see the differences in behavior between
the categories of firms. First, aside from some work done by "research
firms and others," most of the firms involved with silicon photovoltaics
(production of photovoltaics, semiconductors or silicon) are doing work
on monocyrstalline silicon process technology; oil companies are
conspicuously absent. Most of the work in this areaa, across all the
categories of firms involved, is federally funded. Second, some firms in
every category except the space cell manufacturers are exploring
non-ingot silicon technologies; much of this work is federally funded.
Third, some firms in every category except the terrestrial photovoltaic
manufacturers are working on advanced or novel material developments, and
much of this is also federally funded. Fourth, only the oil companies
are involved with cadmium sulfide technology. Fifth, and finally, only
the oil companies' activities and those activities of the terrestrial
photovoltaic manufacturers not directly related to current production are
without significant federal support.
In this chapter we have reviewed the pattern of behavior within each
category of firms involved with photovoltaic production or development
activity, and we have looked at differences between the categories as
well. The most important observations concern the three categories of
firms which are now producing photovoltaics or which seem close to doing
so, namely the present manufacturers, the semiconductor manufacturers,
and the oil companies.
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The present manufacturers are focusing their efforts on current
production. As relatively small firms in a new and uncertain business,
their access to capital is limited and the revenues from actual sales are
important. Most of the research carried on by these firms is closely
related to current production processes. Two of them, however, have
extended the entrepreneurial spirit in which they were founded into the
domain of technological innovation as well and are working with non-ingot
silicon technologies.
The semiconductor firms involved in photovoltaics are not currently
engaged in production. They are large firms whose principal technology
is in some ways related to current photovoltaic technology, and they are
generally working toward ways of entering the photovoltaic market by
applying their presumed mass production know-how to modify
monocrystalline silicon processes. Presumably they are interested in the
expanded market potential following from the lower costs of their
processes.
The oil companies have taken a completely different technological
tack. One, Exxon, has organized a subsidiary (Solar Power Corp.) which
appears to be behaving like the other present manufacturers and is
conducting research at its corporate laboratories. Two others, CFP and
Shell, have invested in cadmium sulfide technology, and appear to be near
production. A fourth, Mobil, has pioneered in a non-ingot silicon
process. With the exception of the activities of Solar Power, the oil
companies are, like the semiconductor firms, looking beyond the present
market. Unlike the semiconductor firms, they are concentrating on
technologies which are quite different from those currently in use.
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In the following chapters we will explore some of the reasons for,
and the policy implications of, these behavior patterns.
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CHAPTER FOUR: TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION IN
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAICS: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
I. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this chapter is to describe the initial development
of a conceptual model or framework of the processes of technology
development and of production in the photovoltaic industry. In the
present manufacture of photovoltaic arrays or modules a set of
techniques, or "blueprints" for production, are being utilized. New
production techniques are being developed which may bring about new
process or product improvements. The ultimate purpose of the framework
is to facilitate the analysis of the factors involved in firms'
investment decisions with regard to development of new technologies, as
well as with regard to their adoption or commercialization.
A literature review was undertaken to guide in the development of
the model (Ocasio). Although the literature surveyed yielded some useful
insights into the technological development of invention process and
their adoption or commercialization, no general theory exists which can
begin to explain a major portion of the factors which appear to be
influencing the photovoltaic industry. As Nelson and Winter have noted,
"prevailing theory of innovation has neither the breadth nor the strength
to provide much guidance regarding the variables that are plausible to
change, or to predict with much confidence the effect of significant
changes" (p. 38).
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Most economic theory treats technological change as "exogenous,"
that is, as an independent phenomenon unaffected by the events and
features of the economic system. This is not due to lack of interest in
technological change; a quick glance at any detailed bibliography on the
subject will rapidly confirm that a large amount of literature has been
concerned with it. But this literature has not been integrated into the
traditional analysis of resource allocation. Studies by Nordhaus (1969)
and Binswanger (1974) are notable exceptions and while these yield useful
insights, their highly restrictive assumptions make their application
untenable. Rather, it is our contention that the treatment of
technological change as exogenous appears to be due to inconsistencies
between technological change and the equilibrium nature of traditional
economics. Bliss, in his treatise on capital theory is quite candid
about the problems in incorporating technological change into economic
theory in general and growth theory in particular:
...technical progress is scarcely compatible with (equilibrium
growth), unless it be the most simple and unconvincing form. Apart
from the problem of imperfect foresight there is even more
impossible difficulty. Normally technical progress must
fundamentally alter the structure of the economy so that there is
impossibility of the pattern of previous events repeating
themselves. (p. 11)
This leaves us with little foundation to rely upon. Rather than
attempting to apply a particular theory to the case of the photovoltaic,
ignoring the inconsistencies that would result between the theories and
the facts, we have taken another route: that of building a simple,
qualitative model of the economic structure of the industry. The
literature review provided some of the "building blocks" for the
development of the conceptual framework.
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The model is based on the premise that an understanding of the
technology development and production processes involves an understanding
of the economic structure of the industry. By the phrase, "technology
development and production processes," we mean to consider jointly the
processes of the development of new technology and the production of
products embodying a given level of technology; that is, we view the new
technology as evolving "endogenously," as part of the economic system.
The structure of that system is defined in terms of prices and markets,
as well as of organizational or institutional phenomena. In a world of
perfect competition, prices and markets are sufficient to understand
economic activity. But the presence of market failures draws responses
from organizations (government, firms, social institutions); the
allocation of resources for technology development and production is
thereby affected. This emphasis on institutional characteristics departs
from traditional economics. More fundamental research is needed to
achieve a better understanding of how structural and institutional
behavior affects the allocation of economic resources.
The conceptual framework was developed to serve two principal
purposes within the context of the goals of this study: first, to
provide a structure for organizing our present understanding of the
investment and production activities of the photovoltaic industry, and
second, to yield useful hypotheses about the factors influencing present
and future industry behavior, particularly with respect to firms'
investment.
As described in the two previous chapters, important phenomena
occurring in the photovoltaic industry greatly complicate our analysis.
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Government intervention in the technology development process is
important. The industry itself is just beginning to take form and there
are substantial indications that the market structure is evolving rapidly.
Uncertainties about future technological developments as well as of
competitive products in other industries is pervasive. These as well as
other complicating factors are all playing a crucial role in the
formation of the industry and therefore cannot be ignored. These
structural characteristics are to be incorporated into our model.
In Section II we develop the simple market framework which serves as
a focus for all subsequent analysis. Initially we study the technology
development and production processes under the highly idealized market
conditions of perfect competition. In Section III we touch upon some of
the market failures in these processes and how organizations respond to
them. The effects of uncertainty are emphasized. In Section IV we
describe how present economic conditions in the production of electricity
are at work to segment the market for photovoltaics and how this will
affect both invention and production. Section V focuses upon historical
considerations of technical choice and technology development for
photovoltaics and their effects on present and future investments in
productive activity and in additional technology development. The
importance of viewing the market for photovoltaics as segmented is
incorporated. Finally, Section VI integrates the preceding discussions
by focusing on the factors which affect investment in the development of
technology to produce photovoltaics and in actual production processes.
Two caveats are in order. First, this is very much an uncompleted
study. We have tried to lay the foundations for further, more specific
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study of factors which will affect the photovoltaic industry. Our work
up to this point serves to present a framework which we believe is useful
for understanding the industry. But much more research, both of a
fundamental nature, and applied to the photovoltaic industry, is needed
for a more in-depth understanding of some of the issues just touched upon
in this analysis. Second, no attempt has been made to test any of the
hypotheses developed. Ideally, econometric models could be built to test
them. But data limitations preclude this. As a part of the agenda for
future research, data analysis of a more descriptive nature can be used
to see if the hypotheses are at least consistent with the facts.
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II. A SIMPLE MARKET APPROACH
In this section we will present a simple model to illustrate the
interrelated markets which affect the technology development and
production processes in the photovoltaics manufacturing industry.
Initially, we will utilize the model to analyze how prices and markets
affect these processes under highly idealized conditions (perfect
competition). In later sections of the study we will expand the model to
take account of institutional and organizational factors.
Simple partial equilibrium analysis of demand and supply does not
explicitly account for intermarket relationships. For the purpose of
this study the simple model shown in Figure 4.1 serves as a compromise:
the principal markets which affect technology development and production
of photovoltaics are presented. Price and market conditions in other
sectors of the economy are treated as exogenous.
In Figure 4.1, production processes are represented by boxes and
markets by small diamonds. Each box is a representative firm. The flow
of commodities is shown by arrows pointing from producers to consumers.
The development of technology and the production or manufacturing of a
commodity are considered to be distinct production processes. Markets
for technology development are thereby included explicitly. The reason
for this separation is that technology development can be considered as a
particular form of capital production which is utilized as an
intermediate product in the manufacture of photovoltaics, or of any other
good. There is no reason why a firm must develop its own technology
under perfect market conditions, just as there is no reason for a firm to
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manufacture the intermediate capital goods it utilizes in its production
process. Rather, as will be explained subsequently, any integration of
production activity can be viewed as arising out of failures in the
market processes (see also Coase and Williamson).
The six production processes incorporated into the simple market
framework are
1) the production of electricity;
2) technology development for electricty production;
3) the production of photovoltaics;
4) technology development for photovoltaics;
5) production of input factors; and
6) technology development for input factor production.
"Factor production" is just an aggregate of the intermediate capital
goods, such as materials, plant, and equipment, as well as nonproducible
goods such as human resources which enter as factors into the production
of photovoltaics. Technology development refers in each case to the
acquisition of capital in the form of information about new products or
processes. This integrates all stages in the development of a technology
from early research through final development.
In addition to the six product markets in Figure 4.1, financial
markets are also included. But financial markets are ignored in this
section since, under the conditions of full information implied by
perfect competition, the supply of investment funds can be considered to
be perfectly elastic, given an exogenously determined market rate of
return.
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The simple market framework presented shows the interrelationships
between all intermediate physical production and technology development
throughout the system. These interrelationships are crucial since in the
case of photovoltaics, changes will be occurring not just in photovoltaic
production itself but in electricity production and in materials
production. With perfect markets, prices will coordinate the system
efficiently, but, as subsequent analysis will show, even in the case of
imperfect markets prices will be a crucial determinant of economic
choice. Prices, demands, and supplies in any one market will affect the
activities in all other markets.
A fundamental observation which is crucial for this section as well
as for the rest of this chapter is that the demand for photovoltaic
arrays or modules is a derived demand from electricity production.
photovoltaics modules are just a particular kind of capital equipment
which can be utilized to produce energy. The demand for photovoltaics is
therefore dependent on the relative costs of production of all
alternative techniques of producing electricity.
An exploration of the highly complex issues involved in electricity
production and generation are beyond the scope of this paper. But some
general comments are in order since photovoltaics are utilized in
electricity production. The costs of generating electricity can be
divided into capital costs, fuel costs, and operating costs. With
photovoltaics there are no fuel costs (solar energy, when available, is
free), and operating and maintenance costs are generally assumed to be
low (this is not true for concentrator systems). Gas, oil, and coal are
the fossil fuels presently utilized in producing electricity.
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Hydroelectric power is used where present, and nuclear power is an
available alternative. Each production technique for electricity
generation has its own set of capital costs, fuel costs, and operation
and maintenance costs. Factor substitution in the generation of
electricity will occur as the relative prices or cost components of
alternative production techniques are altered. Examples of this may be
increases in the price of fossil fuels or decreases in capital costs of a
particular production technique (i.e., photovoltaics).
With most presently utilized production techniques for generating
electricity there are substantial economies of scale. This leads to
central power generation by public utilities. Peak-load problems
complicate the issues. But transmission and distribution costs for the
electricity generated are substantial. For remote applications where
transmission and distribution costs make central power generation too
costly, on-site generation becomes competitive. This observation is
crucial since photovoltaics, where economies of scale are not
substantial, are presently used for remote applications where central
power is not economically or physically feasible.
Besides capital, fuel, and operating costs, other factors may be
important in determining whether photovoltaics are utilized for
electricity generation. Land prices may be important since photovoltaics
presently require a large amount of space. Other factors such as
performance and reliability may also prove important.
Since the demand for photovoltaics is a derived demand, it is
dependent on relative prices of alternative technologies for producing
electricity as well as on total demand for electricity. At the present
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set of relative prices photovoltaics are not cost-competitive for most
electricity production activity. For the equilibrium production of
photovoltaics to increase one or more of the following three things must
occur: 1) an increase in the price of producing electricity by
alternative methods; 2) development of new technology which decreases the
cost of producing photovoltaics; and 3) the attainment of scale economies
in the production of photovoltaics. All of these three can be translated
to the proposition that an increase in the quantity demanded of
photovoltaics will come about from supply considerations, either in
alternative energy asources or in photovoltaicss, which will alter the
structure of relative prices in favor of photovoltaics.
This leads us to consider the conditions affecting supply in the
photovoltaic industry. Ignoring technological developments for the
moment, in long-run equilibrium firms will exploit any available scale
economies so as to achieve minimum costs of production. Firm investment
in plant and capital equipment will depend on the structure of relative
prices in factor markets, given available technologies.
To incorporate technology development in our model we will adopt the
assumption developed by Nordhaus that invention or technology development
is a particular form of capital which by the research, development, and
engineering efforts involved, increases technical knowledge, and improves
productivity. Technological development is then seen as "any kind of
investment that improves the firm's conventional production function"
(Nordhaus, p. 18). The additional assumption is that technology is
disembodied, or independent of any particular production process chosen.
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In the highly idealized perfect market model, the production of
technology is just another factor into the production of intermediate
capital goods, photovoltaics, or of electricity production. The demand
and supply of technology development can be treated as that for any
capital good, as responding to the set of prices prevailing throughout
the system. Markets, through prices, will work to coordinate the system
efficiently. The choice of emphasizing technology development as
compared to plant and equipment will depend on the relative costs and
benefits of the two.
The perfect market model analyzed above is essentially a static
one. The explicit incorporation of time into the model as well as the
dropping of the assumption of disembodied technology development will
necessarily lead us into the sort of market imperfections analyzed in
Section III, for if prices and/or technologies are changing we must have
either perfect foresight or market failures resulting from uncertainty.
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III. MARKET FAILURES AND ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSES
In the previous section, we analyzed technology development and
production in the photovoltaics industry under highly idealized market
conditions. But real markets are never perfect. Markets are sluggish in
adjustment and do not respond instantaneously to economic stimuli.
Market failures of a more fundamental nature such as uncertainty,
externalities, and indivisibilities may also prevail. In this section we
will explore how these failures affect the simple market framework
presented in Figure 4.1.
Traditional economic literature has dealt with market failures as a
rationale for government intervention in the resource process. More
recently, the works of Coase, Williamson, and Arrow (1969, 1974) have
made us realize that government is neither necessary nor sufficient for
correcting market failures and achieving efficient outcomes. This is
particularly true with respect to uncertainty as it applies to the
behavior of government as well as to firm behavior. The important lesson
to be learned from the literature cited above is that firms, as well as
government, will respond to failures in the market by strategic
organizational behavior.
Two forms of market failure explored are externalities and
uncertainty. Externalities refer to interrelated consumption and/or
production activities which are not correctly priced. Uncertainty refers
to the fact "that we do not have a complete description of the world
which we fully believe to be true." (Arrow, 1974, pp. 33-34). It
differs from risk in that relevant probabilities cannot be measured.
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Uncertainty will affect the economic decision-maker's perception of
present and future states of the world. Uncertainties may exist with
respect to present market conditions, due to the complexity of economic
organization, and to the fact that acquisition of information about the
true state of the world is costly. Uncertainties of a more fundamental
nature occur when we extend our analysis to a dynamic framework. In the
dynamic case, the firm's decisions are not only dependent on present
prices and present technology, but on expectations for future prices and
for future technology. Perfect foresight would be needed for
uncertainties not to occur.
The effect of indivisibility will also be explored. Indivisibility
refers to "lumpiness," in production activities, which brings about
economies of scale. While indivisibilities are not strictly a form of
market failure, if the economies of scale brought about are only fully
exploited at levels approximating or exceeding the size of the total
market, competitive situations cannot be sustained and noncompetitive
market structures with varying degrees of monopoly power may come about.
Different market failures affect decision-makers in different ways.
Firms and institutions, through their strategic behavior and internal
organization, will take account of market failures. But given the
existence of uncertainty, "bounded rationality" is prevalent. Bounded
rationality refers to human behavior that is "intendedly rational, but
only limitedly so," (Simon, 1961, p. xxiv). As Williamson explains it:
When transactions are conduction under conditions of uncertainty and
complexity, in which event it is very costly, perhaps impossible, to
describe the complete decision tree, the bounded rationality
constraint is binding. An assessment of alternate organizational
modes, in efficiency respects, becomes necessary...Most decision
problems...are not deterministic but involve decision-making under
uncertainty. For these, the comprehensive decision tree is not apt
even to be feasible. (p. 23)
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With the existence of asymmetrically distributed information the
assumption that economic agents are guided by self-interest makes for the
existence and importance of strategic behavior by firms and
organizations. Strategic behavior may come about even without
asymmetrically distributed information in small-number problems, as in
oligopoly situations. And the existence of strategic behavior implies
that consideration of factors internal to the organization must be
accounted for. Institutional factors are therefore crucial in
understanding the allocation of resources.
The incorporation of institutional factors into an analysis of
investments in photovoltaic technology development and production is
extremely difficult for two main reasons. First, the photovoltaic
industry is a very young one and institutional as well as market
structures are continuously evolving. No analysis based on a fixed set
of institutions, or a fixed set of strategic considerations guiding firm
behavior is useful. Second, given considerations of internal
organizations, each firm's strategic behavior will differ. The
assumption of a representative firm should be abandoned.
Given the great analytical complexities and the lack of fully
developed theories on which to base any analysis, a compromise was
reached for the purposes of this study. The assumption of representative
firms is retained. But indications of where institutional considerations
will be important, and where firm behavior may differ, are included. In
addition, examples of institutional responses to market failures are
given. It should be emphasized that the study of internal organization
of firms is currently an area of active basic reseearch. Important
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questions for public policy have still to be answered. So the analysis
presented here will be tentative and subject to further refinement and
investigation, as well as testing.
Seven major sources of market failure were identified as affecting
the technology development and production processes for photovoltaics.
These are as follows: (1) incorrect pricing of energy; (2) production
uncertainties; (3) technological uncertainties; (4) interdependence of
production and technology development activities; (5) indivisibilities
and the inappropriability of technological developments; (6)
imperfections in financial markets; and (7) noncompetitive market
structures. In most instances the source of these market failures cannot
be traced to a single cause but rather they come about from a combination
of externalities, uncertainties, and indivisibilities. In our analysis,
we will trace the source of these market failures, state their effect
upon technology development and production of photovoltaics, and present
possible forms of organizational responses to them.
A. INCORRECT ENERGY PRICES
Various factors cause an inefficient pricing of energy sources. The
OPEC cartel has affected the price and availability of oil. Certain
sources of energy, such as nuclear power, may have substantial
deleterious environmental impacts and these external effects may provide
a divergence between private and social costs. Oil and natural gas
prices are controlled, possibly creating artificial divergences between
the quantities demanded and supplied. All these problems will distort
prices of alternative energy sources.
70
The incorrect pricing of energy is a market failure external to the
photovoltaics industry. But this will affect the total demand for
electricity and the choice of production techniques for electricity. And
through the market channels shown in Figure 4.1, it will affect the
production and technology development processes for photovoltaics. It
should be noted that there is no agreement of what the "optimal pricing"
of alternative energy sources should be. Considerations of income
distribution are considered by many to be at least as important as
economic efficiency. Public policies with regard to energy pricing will
be of utmost importance.
The first source of market failure, while external to the
photovoltaics industry, will affect it considerably. Given the effect of
present prices of energy, and expectations about future prices upon the
market for electricity, the technology development and production
processes for photovoltaicss will be affected through the regular market
channels. But there is another way through which the economic behavior
of energy markets will affect the photovoltaic industry. And this comes
about not directly because of incorrect energy pricing, but because of
the depletable nature of fossil fuels. As discussed in Chapter Three,
major oil companies, foreseeing the depletion of low-cost oil deposits,
are diversifying their activities to alternative renewable and
undepletable sources of energy of which photovoltaic solar power is only
one of many. Given the vast financial resources of these firms, this may
have a substantial impact upon the future of photovoltaics. This issue
is of importance due to imperfections in financial markets will be
discussed below.
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B. PRODUCTION UNCERTAINTIES
Under perfect market conditions, with full information about prices,
firms' production decisions will be such as to achieve minimum total
costs of production for any level of output. But in a dynamic framework,
firms are uncertain about future prices, and consequently about future
demands and future costs. The decision-making behavior of firms will
therefore be affected.
Even in the short run, demand and production costs for a commodity
are never completely certain. Every business decision entails a certain
amount of risk. But in situations where economic events are changing
rapidly, uncertainties cannot be objectively measured, and bounded
rationality prevails. Such a situation is characteristic of the present
state of the photovoltaics industry, in which future demand and
production costs are both highly uncertain.
Uncertainties about future prices and supplies of substitutes, as
well as about technological development of alternatives, are major
factors affecting the long-run demand for photovoltaics. The
alternatives have differing performance characteristics; this will bring
additional complications. In the short run, uncertainties also come
about because consumers do not possess full information about prices and
quality differentials of all available alternatives, and therefore their
adjustments are gradual and not instantaneous.
When uncertainties are significant, acquisition of information is
called for before decision-making takes place. Firms utilize market
studies and engineering cost estimates to reduce uncertainty. Rules of
thumb which have worked previously, such as "learning curves" and the
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"product life cycle," will be utilized in some instances. But given
bounded rationality, acquisition of full information is not possible.
And since costs of making a "wrong" (ex post) decision are substantial,
firms will tend to utilize an adaptive, sequential decision-making
process.
This is of particular importance with respect to firms' investment
decisions on plant and equipment designed to attain the long-run minimum
costs of production. Given production uncertainties, the optimal scale
of plant will not be attempted at once. Since the market is the final
arbiter of whether an investment decision is profitable, actual market
tests will be utilized. Pilot plants and initial attempts at market
penetration are needed. Firms, if risk-averse, will not seek rapid
attainment of scale economies, but rather will respond gradually to
market signals.
In our analysis of investment decisions in Section VI, we will use
the nomenclature developed by the MIT Energy Laboratory Policy Study
Group, dividing the sequential stages of production of photovoltaics into
two: introduction or commercialization, and mature production or
diffusion.
Production uncertainties, while of utmost importance for firm
decision-making, are a natural part of all production activities and
cannot be eliminated. They are especially prevalent in growing
industries where market factors are continuously changing. How
individual firms respond to these uncertainties in the initial stages of
the industry may have a substantial impact upon future market structure.
For example, according to Williamson, business acumen and historical
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accidents which come about from uncertainties may be an important factor
in the evolution of dominant firms (1976, pp. 208-233).
C. TECHNOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTIES
At the initiation of any technology development effort, estimates of
development cost, development time, and performance are very unreliable.
But during the development effort learning takes place and the
reliability of the estimates is improved. A process of adaptive
sequential decision-making, analogous to that resulting from production
uncertainties, will take place. As a result, "parallel development of
alternative designs seems called for when technical advances are large,
when much additional information can be gained from prototype testing,
and when the costs of a few prototypes are small relative to total system
cost" (Nelson, p. 361).
Due to uncertainties resulting from the development of alternative
technologies, individual projects are highly risky. Given independence
of risks between alternative projects, diversification is called for by
portfolio-balancing considerations. This has obvious implications for
the existence of scale economies in R&D activities.
With the existence of adaptive sequential decision-making for
technology development, stages of development can be identified. For our
analysis of investment decisions in Section VI, we will utilize the terms
initial and final development (see MIT Energy Laboratory Policy Study
1It should be noted that for purposes of the classification of the
state of the technologies in Chapter Three "research" was treated as a
stage preceding initial development, rather than a part of it.
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Group) to classify the stages.1 While initial development involves
parallel development activities to provide technical feasibility, in the
final development stages one configuration is usually chosen as best and
emphasis is put upon the design of manufacturing processes, or what is
sometimes called "engineering development" or "production engineering."
Issues of technological uncertainty are crucial and have important
implications both for positive and for normative analysis. More
fundamental research is needed in this area before a complete evaluation
of their impact upon production and technology development processes in a
particular industry becomes possible.
D. INTERDEPENDENCIES OF PRODUCTION AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
In Figure 4.1 the interdependencies of production and of technology
development activities in the photovoltaics industry are illustrated
through market channels. If markets behave perfectly, all the
interdependencies will be handled efficiently through the price
mechanism. But in reality a combination of market failures --
externalities, uncertainties and indivisibilities -- are interacting to
inhibit the price mechanisms from working properly. Exclusive reliance
on prices and markets will not lead to efficient allocation of resources
within and between technology development and production activities.
The problem of the convergence of expectations is of particular
importance. With the high degree of interdependence between technology
development and production activities, and the adaptive sequential
decision processes which result from the technological and production
uncertainties, prices and the market mechanism may fail to provide
coordinated responses:
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Interdependence by itself does not cause difficulty if the pattern
of interdependence is stable and fixed. For, in this case, each
subprogram can be designed to take account of all the subprograms
with which it interacts. Difficulties arise only if program
execution rests on contingencies that cannot be predicted perfectly
in advance. In this case, coordinating activity is required to
secure agreement about the estimates that will be used a the bases
for action, or to provide information to each subprogram unit about
the activities of the others (March and Simon, p. 159).
Given asymmetrically distributed information and the resulting lack
of convergence of expectations between economic decision-makers,
organizational and institutional arrangements must be made to coordinate
activities. An example might be the coordination of complementary
technological developments for factor production, photovoltaics
manufacturing, and electricity generation, all of which might be reasons
for a certain technology to be viable. A not entirely hypothetical case
might be the development of methods to produce, and photovoltaics
processes to utilize, a "solar grade" silicon (see Chapter Two). If
expectations do not converge, alternative arrangements to the market
mechanism are needed. First, a centralized agency, such as government,
may coordinate the activities. Second, contractual arrangement between
firms is a possible method of coordination. Third, the integration of
activities into a particular firm and the coordination by management is
another alternative. These are not mutually exclusive arrangements and a
combination of them is also possible. In the photovoltaic industry, the
institutional arrangements resulting from market failures in the
coordination of technology development activities are presently
evolving. The first form of organization appears to be the dominant mode
today.
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The coordination of technology development with production is also
an important consideration. Given adaptive sequential decision-making in
both processes, investments in each stage "can be thought of as acquiring
a new asset, where that asset is expected to yield a favorable return
itself, or to open the way to some subsequent investment that will yield
a profit," (MIT Energy Laboratory Policy Study Group, p. 42). But when
the subsequent investment decision is undertaken by another firm, the
lack of convergence of expectations between firms will bring about market
failure. Integration of all stages of technology development and
production within a firm is possible, as is implicitly assumed for the
case of the automotive industry by Linden et al. Other organizational
forms previously mentioned may also occur.
Even though the particular organizational form adopted depends on a
complex set of factors not well understood, some general tendencies can
be hypothesized. Utilizing the terminology developed in the Appendix,
discrete technology developments and learning-by-doing are two distinct
forms of technological improvements. Learning-by-doing is by nature
associated with improvements which come about from experience with the
particular production process being utilized. The forms of engineering
and production development, which are associated with the attainment of
mature production capabilities, are more likely to be done by the
manufacturing firms since they possess the necessary information. The
same is true with respect to the final development of discrete technology
improvements, since the activities in this stage will very likely be
specific to the manufacturing process utilized by a firm. But with
respect to the initial development of discrete technologies, which
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involves the refinement and testing of prototypes in the laboratories,
integration with production activities appears to be less likely. As
discussed in Chapter Three, the bulk of the effort going into developing
discrete technological improvements -- in products and processes -- is
taking place at firms other than those now producing solar cells for the
marketplace (see Section V below).
The coordination of technology development and the achievement of
scale economies in production is of central importance here. Scale
economies which result from indivisibilities in plant and capital
equipment are crucial in attaining lowered costs of production. But
investments in mechanized operation are embodied in a particular
production technology and costly retooling will be necessary if a
discrete new production technology is adopted.
Further research is necessary on the problem of interdependencies of
technology development and production. Particular emphasis should be put
on the forms of vertical integration which may occur. In an emerging
industry undergoing simultaneously the rapid expansion of production and
the development of technologies, as is occurring in the photovoltaics
industry, any analysis of firms' investments is hindered by the fact that
organizational forms are still evolving. But it is imperative that the
evolution of organizational forms and its simultaneous cause-and-effect
relationship with firms' investments be monitored.
E. INDIVISIBILITIES AND THE INAPPROPRIABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENTS
Substantial indivisibilities exist in the technology development
process.
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"Lumpiness of the costs of invention follows from the fact that
knowledge is expensive to produce but cheap to reproduce.
Typically, an invention requires substantial investment in order to
make a product or process feasible. Once this has been
accomplished, however, the costs of transferring knowledge or
realizing the services of the stock of knowledge widely available
are much less." (Nordhaus, p. 36)
These indivisibilities appear to be of greatest importance at the initial
development stage, where engineering and scientific breakthroughs are
necessary, as compared to final development and learning-by-doing.
These indivisibilities bring scale economies to technology
development activities. For analyzing the investment in technology
development by firms it is crucial to consider whether the acquisition of
knowledge can be fully or partially internalized or appropriated.
Without appropriability, external effects will lead the firm to
underinvest in technology developments. On the other hand, full
appropriability of an invention may lead to monopoly power.
The issue of externalities in the invention process and the
possibility of inappropriability is usually dealt with independently of
the existence of indivisibilities. But if the cost of initial production
of an invention is equal to the costs of transferring the invention, this
issue of appropriability is of much less importance.
Various mechanisms for appropriating inventions are possible. The
utilization of patent protection is one. Secrecy is another:
The extent to which a firm is able to control its inventions after
they are sold determines whether a firm will decide to license the
invention or keep it secret...If secrecy prevails, the remedy for
the situation is definitely not to give subsidies for the
performance of research.
The problem of transfer of knowedge is extremely important.
Unfortunately, there is little evidence as to the degree of
appropriability of inventions once they have been patented and
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licensed. It might be suspected that complex inventions "embodied" in
machinery would be more susceptible to appropriability than simple
"disembodied" inventions. (Nordhaus, pp. 39-40.)
F. IMPERFECTIONS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
The U.S. economy has a highly developed set of financial
institutions to allocate investment funds among activities. But the
existence and importance of internal financial capital markets alter the
assumptions necessary for perfect competition to take place. As Spence
recognizes:
...there must be features of the internal capital markets that are
qualitatively different from the external markets. Several aspects
come to mind. There are well known differences in tax treatments of
individual and corporate income. A second is that the investors in
internal markets (the managers) may be better informed than external
investors, at least about a certain range of investment
opportunities. A third is that failure or bankruptcy may be
evaluated differently by stockholders and managers, since the loss
to management of failure is not confined to their financial
involvement in the company as investors. Presumably management
reputation is hurt by financial failure. (p. 168)
If internal capital markets are important, the availability of flow
of funds from internal sources will be a crucial determinant of
investment by firms. Econometric studies of investment in research and
development activities by Mueller and Grabowski confirm the importance of
past profits and thereby of internal availability of funds in determining
investments in technology development. and recent work by Teece confirms
this for the petroleum industry.
A firm may acquire access to internal funding by merger with a large
corporation with substantial financial resources. As discussed in
Chapter Three, this appears to be occurring in the photovoltaic industry
where oil companies (Mobil, Shell, and CFP) are acquiring dominant
interests in technology development and manufacturing firms.
80
Further basic and applied research is needed on the importance of
internal capital markets for the resource allocation process both between
and within firms. Williamson (pp. 132-175) presents an analysis of
multidivisional structure and conglomerate organization and their
relation to the investment process.
G. NONCOMPETITIVE MARKET STRUCTURE
Market concentration in the forms of oligopoly and monopoly is most
commonly attributed to the existence of economies of scale in
production. But other forms of market failure such as externalities and
uncertainty may also lead to market concentration (Williamson).
A vast amount of literature on the relationship between market
structure and technology development and adoption has been developed with
few conclusive results to show. This literature is ably reviewed by
Kamien and Schwartz. Although practically everyone agrees that market
concentration is important, since market concentration may itself come
about because of technology developments (Phillips) no conclusive results
are available and further research is necessary.
Inappropriability along with technological uncertainty and
interdependencies can lead to "myopic" decisions on investment in
technology development. That is, the sequential decision-making process
favors investments in technology changes which derive closely from
technologies in use, in preference to those more distant, even though the
latter may be more valuable to society as a whole over the long run.
Localized changes are likely to result in benefits which are more
appropriable, and are less likely to require extensive coordination or
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exploration of new consuming markets than radical changes. Myopic
investments may in some cases be the most profitable for the firm.
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IV. SEGMENTED MARKETS FOR PHOTOVOLTAICS
When and if the nonremote market for electric power materializes, it
will likely be distinct from the remote market just as the remote
terrestrial market is now distinct from the space market. That is, key
attributes will be valued differently in each of the submarkets. This is
especially the case with any attribute related to the cost of being
remote -- e.g., reliability, since maintenance is more expensive at
remote sites. This is the usual meaning of the phrase, "market
segmentation," and the market for photovoltaics is segmented in this
sense.
However, it is "segmented" in much more significant ways as well.
The demand for photovoltaics will depend on relative costs of production
of electricity with available substitute techniques for each particular
application. With the present prices of photovoltaic power and of
alternatives, photovoltaics are uneconomical for most electricity
applications. But photovoltaics are presently produced for space and for
remote site applications where centrally generated and distributed
electricity is uneconomical. (photovoltaics are also produced for the
government's development program.) Given the large degree of difference
in the structure of relative prices for remote and nonremote
applications, as well as orders of magnitude differentials in size of the
market, photovoltaics produced for remote and nonremote electricity power
generation may for practical purposes be considered as different products.
It is our contention that viewing the markets for electricity, and
consequently the derived market for photovoltaics, to be segmented in
this larger sense is a useful way of analyzing the technology development
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and production processes in the photovoltaic industry. Three principal
submarkets are distinguished: 1) the market for space application; 2)
the market for remote terrestrial applications; and 3) the market for
nonremote terrestrial applications.1 It should be noted that
considering the markets as segmented does not imply that the markets are
not interrelated. On the contrary, prices, technologies, and production
processes may serve as links between them.
The differences in the cost of closely competitive substitutes
between submarkets is a crucial factor accounting for segmentation. In
space applications, the long life, minimum power, and low weight
characteristics of photovoltaics were factors in their choice by NASA and
the Department of Defense for powering satellites. For remote
applications, their possibility of generating electricity at small
scales, their reliability, and insubstantial costs of operation and
maintenance appear to be factors affecting their adoption relative to
available alternatives, principally batteries or diesel generators.
Nonremote applications, at the present set of relative prices, are not
cost-competitive and are thereby not utilized.
Solar cells and modules produced for different submarkets may also
prove to be differentiated products. Reliability is crucial for space
appliations but less so for remote terrestrial applications in which
price considerations take greater importance. Differentiated products
will be produced for each submarket. For nonremote applications, if and
1We have lumped together the two nonremote markets which ERDA uses
for its planning purposes (the load-center and the utility markets).
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when developed, efficiency may be a much more crucial consideration than
for the remote power submarket. Differentiated products may well
coexist. In general, it can be stated that quality attributes which vary
in importance for different applications will bring about differentiated
products. The greater the product differences, the greater the degree of
market segmentation that may occur. (For a theoretical analysis of how
product differences affect demand and supply considerations in
competitive markets, see Rosen).
Given quality differentials and their effects upon demand and supply
of differentiated photovoltaic products among submarkets, complementary
technology developments may also differ among them. For instance, solar
concentrators may be important for nonremote markets but unimportant for
others. The same may be true for technology developments in factor
markets.
Different types of firms are involved in technology development and
production for the different segments. In Chapter Three we indicated
that the space cell manufacturers tend to focus on production for the
space cell market. Similarly, the firms now in production for the remote
terrestrial market seem to show less immediate interest in the nonremote
market than do the larger oil companies and semiconductor manufacturers.
Finally, but possibly of greatest importance for our analysis, the
factors affecting investment decisions for technology development and/or
for production of photovoltaics are geared to the different submarkets.
Even with product differences, this need not be so under idealized market
conditions. But given market and technological uncertainties and the
resulting incremental behavior of firms with respect to technology
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development and production, as described in Section III, firms will take
a "myopic," localized view of the submarkets involved. Thus we see (as
discussed in Chapter Three) the present producers focusing primarily on
incremental improvements for lowering the cost of monocrystalline silicon
cells. In contrast, the oil companies and semiconductor manufacturers
are looking ahead to the larger, lower-cost markets by developing
different product technologies (especially cadmium sulfide) and process
technologies (amorphous and sheet monocrystalline). Later in this
chapter we will explore more fully the implications of this market
segmentation.
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V. TECHNICAL CHOICE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS IN PHOTOVOLTAIC SUBMARKETS
In the previous section we discussed the existence of distinct
submarkets for photovoltaics. The three major submarkets identified were
the space market, the remote terrestrial market, and the nonremote
terrestrial market. This segmentation of the market has implications for
the past, present, and future of the technology development process which
will be presently analyzed. Emphasis will be put upon the effect of
localized technology developments both within and between submarkets. A
more complete exposition of some of the concepts and terminology utilized
to describe and explain the technology development process is presented
in the Appendix.
As described in Section I of Chapter Three, present monocrystalline
silicon cell technology was developed in the mid-19bOs, but its principal
use has been to power satellites in outer space. In 1973 successful
production and marketing of photovoltaics for terrestrial use was first
undertaken. All indications are that sales of photovoltaic arrays for
remote terrestrial sites are now rapidly expanding.
The realization that low-cost sources of energy for producing
electricity are becoming scarce has stimulated interest on the part of
government, of private individuals, and of corporations in developing
alternative sources of energy. This interest has been strongly
reinforced by the Arab oil embargo. The overriding interest of many,
including the government, appears to be on extending the utilization of
photovoltaics into the much larger nonremote terrestrial submarket, and
thereby making a substantial contribution to total energy production.
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The present technology available for producing solar cells is
capable of being applied in nonremote uses, such as central power
generation and on-site power for commercial and/or residential
structures. The principal barrier to its application is that the costs
of producing electricity with silicon solar cells are, at the present,
substantially higher than those of competing available techniques. But
both the federal government, through ERDA, and private corporations are
investing resources in developing alternative technologies for producing
photovoltaics, and achieving cost reductions.
It is our contention that there has been some order in the evolution
of the processes of technology development and production of
photovoltaics. Technical choices have been made and will continue to be
made which will affect this evolution. The forces motivating these
choices are extremely complex and involve considerations of the economic
structure of the industry, including the sort of institutional
considerations which were discussed in Section III. These considerations
will, for simplicity, be ignored when not crucial for the analysis.
Since the demand for photovoltaic arrays is a derived demand for a
capital good, the choice of production technique is best studied from the
viewpoint of electricity production. Radical differences exist in the
availability of alternatives with the qualitative attributes needed for
each submarket. Technical choices between submarkets will then likewise
be radically different. Trade-offs between costs and performance and
quality attributes are possible within submarkets and account for the
utilization (or consideration) of diverse production techniques, but they
are of lesser importance. Within each submarket, the production
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technique utilized is that which minimizes costs over the available
process frontier (see the Appendix) with a given set of performance
criteria.
As discussed more fully in the Appendix, technological developments
may be divided into three categories: short-run learning-by-doing,
long-run learning-by-doing, and discrete technical changes. The
technological developments occurring within each category differ in two
aspects. The range of potential technological choices considered by a
firm developing a technology varies with the category, and long-run
technological progress within an industry may vary depending upon which
category of technological development has been occurring.
Short-run learning-by-doing refers to the process improvements which
result during production but are not the result of specially delineated
development projects. Thus short-run learning-by-doing is "free" to
management and results from the normal pressures for cost reduction. In
its narrowest definition, the "learning curve" reflects short-run
learning-by-doing. The typical example of short-run learning-by-doing
effects is improvements in worker productivity due to increased
experience with a particular task. In photovoltaics one might observe
this effect in the soldering together of strings of cells and in the
handling of the strings.
Long-run learning-by-doing consists of those changes to product or
process technology that are modifications of, but closely related to, the
dominant technology. It is generally the development focus of firms in
production with the dominant technology, because it is the natural
outcome of the incremental decision-making process discussed in Section
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III. An investment is required to achieve long-run learning-by-doing
because, unlike short-run learning-by-doing, long-run learning-by-doing
results from deliberate research efforts. In photovoltaics, long-run
learning-by-doing includes most of those efforts of industry and
government to find cheaper ways of producing monocrystalline silicon
solar cells. For example, work to develop larger saws for the
Czochralski ingots or to develop new methods for soldering together
strings of cells are examples of long-run learning-by-doing.
Discrete technological changes are those which are qualitatively
different from the dominant technology. They are generally not developed
by firms involved in production with the dominant technology and differ
from long-run learning-by-doing effects largely in the nature of the
investment undertaken. Investments in discrete technological changes
usually reject current process technology almost entirely. In
photovoltaics, some clear examples of potential discrete technological
change include cadmium sulfide, gallium arsenide, and amorphous
photovoltaics and their related production processes. Within silicon
technology, examples also exist, such as sheet or cast silicon, EFG, and
dendritic web, all alternatives to Czochralski silicon. Certain
alternative methods of purifying silicon, such as silane processes, are
also discrete technological options.
Successful investment in discrete technological change would thus
make many investments in former process technology worthless. For this
reason one would expect to see firms currently using the dominant
technology to refrain from discrete technological changes.l
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These concepts of short-run learning-by-doing, long-run
learning-by-doing, and discrete technological change add insight to the
history of photovoltaics technology. In the photovoltaic market for
space applications, the technical choice which resulted in the
utilization of monocrystalline silicon solar cells was made by the
relevant government agencies. Taking into account the performance
attributes needed for generation of electricity, a choice was made among
available electricity-production techniques. Manufacturers responded by
producing silicon arrays for space use. Localized technological changes
(short-run and long-run learning-by-doing) took place, and performance
improvements and cost reductions resulted. Given the low efficiency and
reliability problems of cadmium sulfide cells, the most fully developed
photovoltaic alternative to monocrystalline silicon, and the high degree
of technological uncertainty associated with all other alternatives, the
space submarket yielded little incentive for discrete technology
developments.
The same photovoltaic cells and arrays manufactured for space
application were available for terrestrial applications, although their
high cost made their use quite limited. Product quality changes
and long-run learning-by-doing resulted in process changes which yielded
1A pedagogic example to help illustrate the difference between
long-run learning-by-doing and discrete technological change may be
useful. Consider the market for methods to eliminate mice. If the
mousetrap is the dominant technology, efforts to build a better mousetrap
are long-run learning-by-doing while developing mouse repellent would be
discrete technological change. While a manufacturer of mousetraps would
probably be engaged in building a better mousetrap, it is unlikely that
it would develop mouse repellent, or at least no more likely that it
would do so rather than another firm which manufactured, say, insect
repellents.
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cost reductions geared especially for remote terrestrial applications.
Thus a new process which evolved from the product of the space submarket
became part of the available process frontier for the remote terrestrial
submarket. Given the high cost of power for remote applications,
photovoltaic arrays compete with other techniques for producing
electricity. With a given set of performance criteria, photovoltaics
will be adopted if they reduce the cost of producing electricity.
Expansion of the remote terrestrial submarket will take place with cost
reductions and/or performance improvements. Technology developments are
designed to achieve this.
Choices must be made between investments in discrete technology
developments and in long-run learning-by-doing. Given the higher degree
of uncertainty and inappropriability associated with the former, a
"myopic," localized set of technological improvements would, in general,
prevail. Discrete developments, while possible, are much more likely to
come from outside the manufacturing firm.
Decisions are greatly complicated because of conditions prevailing
in the nonremote terrestrial submarket. At the present set of relative
prices for producing electricity, photovoltaics are uneconomical for
generating either central power or on-site electricity. But given the
perceived depletion of low-cost fossil fuels in the near future, a search
is underway for alternative energy resources. As discussed in Chapter
Three, firms and the government are investing funds in discrete
technology developments. Given the small size of the remote submarket
and the high technological uncertainty involved, these same improvements
were much less likely to be developed with that market in mind, and in
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fact present manufacturers are not heavily involved in research on
discrete changes. Once developed for nonremote applications, these
changes will become part of the available process frontier for remote
applications.
This implies that the "myopic," localized changes which would take
place for the remote submarket may be restrained by expectations about
future discrete technology developments which may render inoperative the
effects of learning-by-doing and scale economies peculiar to the present
technology. This will inhibit investments -- in technology or in plant
-- which are tied to the present technology. The degree of importance of
this factor depends upon the costs of the particular investment
contemplated.
Two principal strategies are available for achieving the cost
reduction and quality improvements necessary for penetration of
photovoltaics in the nonremote submarket. These are, first, the
achievement of localized learning-by-doing with present production
technology and second, discrete technology development. Firms'
investment in one or the other will depend upon the relative costs of
development of each and of the expectations of achieving and
appropriating the benefits from the necessary cost reductions.
The choice between these two strategies will have implications for
the future availability of production techniques. The greater the cost
reductions and quality improvements achieved with learning effects and
scale economies with present production techniques, the greater the
technical gap between this technology and its alternatives is. Future
adoption of alternative technologies will become increasingly difficult.
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The greater the difficulty of transferring knowledge and production plant
and equipment from one technology to another, the greater is the degree
of resulting gaps. Under primary conditions, "myopic" behavior of firms
would favor the first strategy. With the opportunities available in the
nonremote submarket for electricity, the efforts at developing discrete
technogical improvements become much more attractive.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: INVESTMENTS IN THE PV INDUSTRY
In the chapter we have initiated the development of a conceptual
framework for analyzing the technology development and production
processes in the photovoltaic industry. Although considerable further
development is obviously necessary, lessons from the analysis to this
point will be utilized in this final section to present preliminary
hypotheses regarding the direction and magnitude of the factors affecting
investments in the process.
Several important concepts have been developed and explored in the
analysis presented in this chapter, and they will form the basis for our
discussion of the factors influencing investments in technology
development and production in photovoltaics. First, and most important,
we have treated technology development as an economic activity -- one
that is influenced by factors of both supply (costs and likelihood of
successful development) and demand (value of the product). However, the
market for photovoltaics is exceedingly complex; it is riddled with
"market failure." These failures lead to economic activities and
organizational structures which are difficult to analyze, but some
theoretical hypotheses can be constructed and empirically tested in a
simple way against the crude data reported in Chapter Three of this
report.
Second, we have adopted the division of technical change into three
classes (short-run and long-run learning-by-doing, and discrete changes)
and have associated the latter two with developments now taking place in
the photovoltaic industry, as discussed in Chapter Two of this report.
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Short-run learning-by-doing is an inevitable by-product of production,
and is affected by government policy or other external influences only
through the quantity procured. Long-run learning-by-doing and discrete
technical change result from different sorts of economic decisions, and
interact in a way that tends to give past events a strong influence over
present decisions. Most significantly in photovoltaics, monocrystalline
silicon technology and present production processes tend to be the
natural focus of development activities, even though it is not at all
clear that they will be superior over the long run.
Finally, we have argued that the photovoltaic market may usefully be
viewed as strongly segmented, based on our analysis in three segments --
the markets for electricity in space, at remote terrestrial sites, and at
nonremote terrestrial sites. In each segment photovoltaics face
different competition and thus must meet different cost goals.
Therefore, different technologies are being developed or are in
production, and different institutions are involved. Firms presently
producing for the remote power market are engaged in long-run
learning-by-doing development activities (and most government support is
going to related technologies). Institutions interested in the nonremote
market are investing in discrete technical changes. Factors influencing
the remote power market are likely to have a limited influence on the
nonremote market.
With these concepts in mind, we can proceed with an elementary
identification and analysis of the factors influencing investments in the
different stages of photovoltaic technology development and production.
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We will deal exclusively with investments by present and potential
manufacturers. Although firms with no manufacturing potential for
photovoltaics, nonprofit organizations such as universities, and
government will
undoubtedly play an important role, their investment decisions are not
analyzed. Given our belief that the segmentation of photovoltaic
production into submarkets is a useful tool of analysis, the hypotheses
presented will be dependent upon each particular submarket. The space
submarket will not be considered.
The six investment decisions considered are:
(1) investments in initial, discrete technology development;
(2) investments in final, discrete technology development;
(3) investments in long-run learning-by-doing;
(4) investments in introduction for the remote terrestrial market;
(5) investments in mature production (plant and capital equipment)
for the remote terrestrial market; and
(6) investments in introduction for the nonremote market.
Each individual investment decision of a firm is evaluated with
respect to its costs and benefits. The information acquisition potential
of each investment must be taken into account if adaptive sequential
decision-making is utilized. If the costs and benefits can be
quantified, an internal rate of return may be estimated. In any case,
subjective factors and internal considerations are part of the evaluation
process.
Evaluation of costs and benefits of each investment project must be
done on an individual basis with due regard to the interaction among
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investments. Rather than attempting to list all factors which would be
considered, another method was utilized. A preliminary set of hypotheses
on the first-order effects of various factors on the six investment
decisions considered is presented in two tables. Table 4.1 deals with
investments in the development of new photovoltaic technology, while
Table 4.2 deals with investments in actual photovoltaic production
capacity. The list of factors is selective and not exhaustive, and
refers to exogenous influences on the investment process.
The effects considered operate principally through the regular
market channels of demand and supply. The hypotheses presented refer to
the effects for representative, risk-averse firms. These are derived
from elementary economic principles, the concepts developed in this
chapter, and the factual evidence on the photovoltaic industry presented
in Chapters Two and Three. The tentative nature of the hypotheses is
clearly evident; further study and empirical verification is imperative.
Because the results shown in the tables follow so closely from the
analysis presented, relatively little direct explanation is necessary.
For example, if our hypotheses are correct, then increased demand for
photovoltaics in the remote market will have little impact on private
sector investments in discrete technological changes because the present
remote market can be most readily exploited and even expanded by
incremental cost reductions, and long-run learning-by-doing is thus
encouraged in this case. Similarly, government investments in long-run
learning-by-doing make private investments in discrete change less
attractive by tending to delay the time when desired changes will be
superior in some market.
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The first-order nature of the effects considered should be
emphasized. This is not meant to imply that second and higher order
effects are not important -- they are. But second and higher order
effects are dependent on the relative magnitudes of all interacting
effects, which is well beyond the power of the analysis presented here.
Empirical evaluation of actual investment data is necessary.
A simple illustration of how second order effects may operate is in
order. The government procurement program has been assumed here to last
only temporarily, ending before commercialization of photovoltaics for
nonremote markets becomes profitable. Given this assumption, its direct
effect on investments in introduction in nonremote markets is
hypothesized to be "probably unimportant," but second order effects are
likely to take place. If the government procurement program increases
the profits of photovoltaic manufacturers, greater internal funding of
investments will become available. This will have a positive effect. On
the other hand, the procurement program also affects investments in the
long-run learning-by-doing with the present technology. If this
technology cannot become competitive in nonremote markets, the
achievement of learning effects may actually retard the introduction of
alternative technologies that can. So the second and higher order
effects of the government procurement program on private investments in
the introduction stage of photovoltaic production for nonremote markets
are far from clear. The same applies to second and higher order effects
for other factors.
It is clear from this example, as well as the discussion throughout
this chapter, that analysis of technological change is an exceedingly
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difficult task. No serious analysis of the effects of policy variables
or other exogenous factors can take place without a more formal modeling
effort combined with empirical study of actual investment data. In the
case of the emerging photovoltaics industry, both theory and data are in
short supply. However, the conceptual effort reported in this chapter
provides at least a framework for thinking about the behavior of the
photovoltaics industry and some of the policy issues associated with its
development.
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CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this report we have presented the results of a preliminary effort
aimed, first, at determining the present status and structure of the
industry developing and producing solar photovoltaics and, second, at
outlining an initial conceptual framework for understanding that
structure and, more importantly, analyzing the evolution of this industry
and the associated technology. In this chapter we present a number of
considerations, deriving from the work reported here, that should be
incorporated in the development of federal policy toward photovoltaic
technology.
If the concepts emerging from our study of the photovoltaic industry
are valid (and certainly they remain to be formulated rigorously and
tested), they have implications for the formulation of federal policy
with respect to the development of photovoltaics. Because of the
preliminary nature of our work, we utilize these implications only to
raise issues or possibilities that should be considered in the
policy-making process; we do not offer any hard recommendations for the
policies emerging from that process.
Many possible modes and tools of federal intervention might be
invoked to correct the features in the market for photovoltaics and
photovoltaics technology and to support federal photovoltaics policy.
They would include everything from doing nothing, or passively correcting
prices for photovoltaics or photovoltaics technology, to total
coordination of the evolving market. We here restrict our comments to
analysis of those activities the federal government is now undertaking,
rather than to the design of alternative policies.
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TECHNOLOGY CHOICE
The most important issues arise with respect to the
interrelationships between the opportunities for technological change in
photovoltaics and the relation of those opportunities to the structure of
the photovoltaic market. We have divided the technical options in
photovoltaics into three classes: short-run and long-run
learning-by-doing and discrete changes. Roughly speaking, short-run
learning-by-doing includes those small, incremental changes to present
product and process technology which derive naturally from actual
production. Such changes are occurring now in the industry and are
presumably responsible for some part of the cost reductions which
occurred over the last decade as photovoltaics expanded from the space
market into remote terrestrial applications, and in the last two or three
years, as costs for remote terrestrial applications have fallen.
Long-run learning-by-doing consists of those distinct but still
incremental modifications to present production processes, i.e., less
expensive ways of manufacturing monocrystalline silicon cells based on
the Czochralski technique. Discrete changes would include the numerous
alternatives to the dominant technology -- monocrystalline silicon
sheets, amorphous silicon, other materials, etc.
Most identifiable development efforts in any field are generally
focused on long-run learning-by-doing. The reasons for this, as
discussed in Chapter Four, are related principally to the decision-making
process in the face of high levels of uncertainty and to appropriability
problems. This focus can have important effects on the ultimate
evolution of the technology. Most significantly, such behavior is often
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"myopic," in the sense that over the long run, society might be better
off if efforts had been focused on discrete changes. The "myopia" is
self-reinforcing in that as the dominant technology responds to efforts
at long-run learning-by-doing, discrete changes look less attractive and
are less likely to draw investment.
Myopic technology choice may be occurring in photovoltaic
development programs today. As discussed in Chapter Three, much of the
total (public and private) photovoltaic RD&D effort seems to be aimed at
long-run learning-by-doing, and for the usual reasons. Especially in the
case of the federally-supported efforts, the sense of urgency and the
associated tight deadlines result in a focus on modifications to present
production techniques. Planning is explicitly based on a notion of
continuous reductions in cost, reductions that are apparently based on
the concept of a continuously evolving technology. Thus, meeting
industry cost goals in 1980 or 1982 is viewed as a necessary precondition
to meeting much more ambitious goals later in the 1980's. Our analysis
indicates that this concept, and therefore the plans based upon it,
should be seriously questioned.
The issue is especially important in the light of the segmentation
of the photovoltaic market. As discussed in Chapter Four, the
photovoltaic market can be viewed as three related but distinct
submarkets -- those involving cells for use in outer space, at remote
terrestrial sites, and at nonremote terrestrial sites. The product and
process technologies, the costs of competing electric power sources, and
the institutions (researchers, buyers, sellers, and others) are
reasonably distinct for each submarket. It is clear that photovoltaics
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will contribute to federal energy goals only if they can penetrate the
nonremote market. However, the segmentation implies that institutional
and economic success in the remote market may be relatively unrelated to
success in the nonremote market. The accessibility of the remote market
to long-run learning-by-doing (and success in meeting "interim" goals)
thus does not imply that discrete changes will not be needed for success
in the nonremote market (and for meeting "long-run" goals). In fact,
emphasis on modifications to monocrystalline silicon processes now may
have the effect of limiting the availability of superior technologies in
the future.
SELECTION OF FIRMS AND INDUSTRIES
A related set of issues is associated with the federal government's
actions to promote or inhibit investments by certain categories of firms
in photovoltaic technology development and production. Many
considerations bear upon these issues, including high-level social
decisions relating to equity and the political power accruing to large
corporations; we will confine our comments to the implications of our
analysis, and these relate principally to efficiency issues. First, as
discussed in Chapter Three, the federal government is now subsidizing the
acquisition by semiconductor firms of large increments in process
technology (long-run learning-by-doing). (Some discrete developments are
being subsidized in that industry as well.) No other category of firms
receives this sort of assistance to nearly the same extent. The
selection of the semiconductor firms was the result of a widely held view
that low-cost solar cell manufacturing will be closely related to present
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semiconductor process technologies because presently dominant
semiconductor and photovoltaic technologies both center around
monocrystalline silicon structures.
However, for reasons discussed in Chapter Three, we have concluded
that this relationship is not nearly as close as it appears to be. Most
importantly, semiconductor process technology involves placing many
electronic functions on tiny silicon chips, while monocrystalline silicon
solar cell processes involve doing very little to large areas of
silicon. Further, the processes seem to be diverging -- as new
techniques are being developed for implanting microcircuits, and as many
of the discrete technical options for flat-plate photovoltaics do not
involve expensive silicon monocrystals. Thus, good reason exists to
question the evolving partnership between the semiconductor industry and
the federal government in this area. These reasons should be equally
valid within the semiconductor firms and in public policy forums, and
this may explain why many of the semiconductor firms' efforts are
supported by the federal government rather than by the firms themselves.
Somewhat to the contrary, there is a commitment to photovoltaics by
oil companies which is surprisingly large given the apparent lack of any
technical connection. As discussed in Chapter Three, in these firms the
internal pressures to maintain the size of the firm in the face of recent
and anticipated declines in the natural resource base they control have
led them into investments in substitutes for petroleum. The problems new
ventures often have in finding capital can make such internal capital
markets an important source of funds for the development of new energy
technologies such as photovoltaics. Furthermore, the oil companies are
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investing a very high proportion of the photovoltaic effort in discrete
technological advances, in marked contrast to the semiconductor firms.
It seems that the lack of commitment to monocrystalline silicon
technology, combined with the relatively long time horizon associated
with the serious depletion of petroleum resources (several decades), has
freed the oil firms from the potentially "myopic" view of the
semiconductor firms and the federal government. If development and
widespread utilization of photovoltaics is desirable (and this certainly
seems to be a central tenet of the federal government's photovoltaic
policy), then oil company efforts in this area should not be
discouraged. In particular, policies concerning horizontal divestiture
should be seriously questioned, at least with respect to photovoltaic
development.
However, any discussion of the role of particular industries in the
evolving photovoltaic market is somewhat off the mark from the start.
One of the important lessons to be learned from historical studies of
technological change is that very often innovations occur as firms from
initially unrelated industries invade the territory of established
firms. It is presumptous on our part, or the federal government's, to
estimate at this early stage in the development of photovoltaics which
firms or class of firms are most likely to be successful in a big way.
Thus, while there is serious doubt about the efficacy of market forces in
guiding particular firms into or out of photovoltaics, there is equally
serious doubt about the ability of the government to know how to make
appropriate corrections to the market's guidance. It is tempting, under
the circumstances, to recommend policy neutrality in this respect. That
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is, that federal development or procurement funding should not be
targeted toward or away from particular firms or industries. This would
represent a preference for errors in the marketplace over errors in
government policy, clearly a value-laden choice. The most that can be
said, therefore, is that any such policy should be preceded by a careful
analysis of both technical and market relationships. Ultimately, it is
to be hoped that fundamental research in this area might aid in such
policy decisions.
Some of these issues in photovoltaic policy are the subject of
ongoing discussion and are deservedly controversial. Some presently are
not issues at all. While our analysis would seem to offer some hints as
to appropriate policy directions, we can offer little in the way of
empirical support. We assert with little hesitation, however, that each
of these issues is deserving of attention in the policy process.
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APPENDIX: TECHNICAL CHOICE AND TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
i~~~ i i m m I I i m _i i
A crucial concept underlying the analysis in Chapter Four is that
technology development involves the utilization of economic resources and
responds to economic stimuli. Investment in technology development is
motivated by profit considerations and is induced by expectations about
future demand and supply and by changes in relative factor prices. The
model of technical choice and innovation developed by Paul David, which
we will utilize, permits us to understand the crucial links between
changes in relative factor prices and technology development. The David
model was highly influenced by previous work on technical change done by
Salter, and by Atkinson and Stiglitz.
In making economic decisions the firm is constrained by existing
technical knowledge. In traditional economic analysis the existing
technology can be characterized fully by the concept of a production
function. The production function embodies the purely technical
relationships which represent at any time the best state-of-the-art
methods for converting any combination of inputs into outputs,
independently of present (or past) relative factor prices.
In applying this concept to actual production processes Chenery
found that only a limited set of techniques or blueprints for production
were available at a point in time. A much wider set of potential
production processes, more in correspondence with the concept of a
production function, were thought to be technically feasible. But they
were not yet ready for production. Choices had been made in the past with
respect to which particular productive techniques to develop fully to the
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stage where they were capable of being used in actual production. This
resulted from the fact that the development effort involves the
utilization of substantial economic resources. As Salter describes the
problem:
...First, a choice must be made as to which of the countless methods
that are technically feasible in principle are sufficiently
commercially promising to be worth developing in detail. No
engineer goes to the trouble and expense of developing techniques
which he is certain will prove uneconomic. The difficulty is that
even at this early stage, costs, and through them factor prices,
intrude to some extent. A method, rejected for detailed development
on the grounds that it is commercially impracticable, may have been
regarded as promising if factor prices were differernt. For
example, oil-fired locomotives were probably technically feasible
fifty years ago but would not have been considered worth developing
in view of the relative prices of oil and coal then prevailing.
Secondly, in even the simplest designed process there are numerous
alternatives which must be decided on the basis of cost: whether
control should be automatic or manual, whether bearings should be of
bronze or steel, or countless other everyday decisions of engineers,
are essentially cost decisions within the framework of technical
restraint; they are quasi-economic decisions which precede choice by
businessmen. (p. 14.)
To clarify the distinction between the economic concept of a
production function and the notion of a limited set of discrete
production processes the concepts of "Fundamental Production Function"
and "Available Process Frontier" were introduced by Chenery and Salter
and adopted by David. The first, which includes the broad set of
potential production processes which can be developed with reasonable
prospects of technological success, corresponds more closely to what is
usually meant by a production function. It is constrained by present
engineering knowledge. But the attainment of any particular technique on
the Fundamental Production Function may involve substantial development
costs. On the other hand, the latter concept corresponds to the limited
set of processes which can be presently put to use in the production of a
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commodity. These processes which are presently available are a result of
past economic choice of which processes to develop fully.
An implication of the above concepts is immediately clear. The
traditional distinction between factor substitution, or change in
technique, and technical change, which involves the development of new
technologies, becomes blurred. This is shown in Figure A.1, for the
production of a homogeneous good, measured as Y. Two factors of
production labor, L, and capital, K, are considered. The available
process frontier is denoted by APF and the fundamental production
function by FPF. At initial relative prices, p, point A represents the
cost-minimizing factor combination. That is, pp is one of a set of
parallel lines of constant cost per unit of output (their slope is given
by p), and A is the point on the APF which lies on the constant cost line
closest to the origin, pp. Ray a is the activity line representing a
constant ratio of labor to capital per unit of output. The technology at
A is assumed to be in long-run equilibrium, where the available
production technique coincides with the maximum technological development
attainable, given present engineering knowledge. An increase in the
relative price of labor from p to p' will induce the development of
technology to point B on the FPF. Whether the technology at point B will
actually be developed will depend on whether the costs of development are
smaller than the benefits to be attained by the technological change.
David extended the above analysis in two dimensions: first, by
recognizing "that the price-guided choices made along the APF will be
altering the position of the latter frontier, and also that of the FPF
via the effect such decisions must have upon the acquisition of
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Figure A. 1
Technical Innovation Viewed as Substitution
(David, p.63)
· __
engineering knowledge," (p. 65); and second, by extending the analysis to
include the conclusion of Atkinson and Stiglitz that learning-by-doing
gives rise to localized technical change.
Learning-by-doing refers to the improvements in productivity which
grow out of production experience and are thereby correlated with
cumulative output. Although a given technical advance occasioned by
learning-by-doing may give rise to some spillover or external effects, it
will very often be "localized," that is, applicable only (or primarily)
to the production process (or ray) being utilized at any given time. In
general, such localized technical improvement will bias the APF and
possibly the FPF toward the direction of present productive processes. A
choice of technique for present production will bias the availability of
techniques, since some techniques will be more fully developed and
improved upon than others, therefore making drastic changes in technique
less likely. This has implications for a normative theory of technology
development since a myopic technical choice, which does not consider the
potentials of future improvements in different technologies, but only
their cost-competitiveness in the present and near future, will not be
optimal in any dynamic sense. According to David, due to the
difficulties in internalizing the benefits from technology developments,
firms will make their technical choices myopically.
As Rosenberg suggests, the local character of learning-by-doing
comes about from people's preoccupation with problems found in actual
experience with production techniques. Internal technical relations
between the elements of a productive activity will generate a succession
of "compulsive sequences" of readily apparent "engineering challenges"
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which will focus inventive activity in a particular direction. Physical
bottlenecks in the production process serve as signals to engineers, and
technological refinements emerge as responses to them. According to
David, "this constitutes a long-run form of learning-by-doing, a process
of interplay between men and machines, or between groups and
organizations, rather than the passive conformity of the ordinary agents
of production to rules and systems laid down by heroic
inventor-entrepreneurs" (pp. 59-60).
David draws the distinction between long-run learning-by-doing and
short-run learning-by-doing, as forms of increases in productivity. The
former involves localized technological improvements and consequently
implies that economic resources must be utilized (i.e., investments must
be made) for the development of this type of productivity improvement.
The latter involves productivity increases which may come about as a
result of increased management efficiency and the attainment of
experience by the labor force with a fixed physical capital investment.
Learning-by-doing implies an irreversible form of increasing returns
to scale. The generation of these localized (activity-specific)
innovations may thereby lead to increased market concentration as long as
the learning effects are fully internal to (appropriable by) the firm
generating them. In the other extreme case, learning-by-doing effects
are completely external to the firm (nonappropriable), and all competing
producers benefit from these effects. A more likely outcome is a middle
ground, where some learning effects can be appropriated, but where there
are still substantial externalities among firms. It should be noted that
the amount of a firm's investment in achieving long-run learning effects
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will depend upon the appropriability of that same effect by the firm that
undertakes that investment.
Substantial evidence exists that learning-by-doing effects have
empirical validity and are not merely a theoretical curiosity. David
studied the existence of long-run learning-by-doing in the cotton textile
industry in the United States during the nineteenth century. An
interesting conclusion of that study is that many of the learning effects
obtained by firms were simply repetition of learning effects previously
obtained by other firms. Short-run learning effects have been
experienced in Swedish steel works at Horndal in 1835-36 where no further
investments in physical capital were made, but where labor productivity
increased around 2 percent per year. This gave the name of "Horndal
effect" to short-run learning effects. Other carefully recorded examples
are the reduction of labor costs of airframe production and the
experience of integrated cotton textile mills in Lowell, Massachusetts.
(See David, pp. 171-191.)
A similar conception of the process of technology development is
found in the study by Abernathy and Utterback entitled "Innovation and
the Evolution of Technology in the Firm." This analysis permits us to
understand the distinction between two specific patterns of technological
innovations. One is referred to as "radical product changes," or
discrete technology developments. These involve an entrepreneurial act
and require drastic reorientation of productive activity. The other
specific pattern is incremental in nature, is associated with a
particular product line and corresponds to the concept of
learning-by-doing (long-run). Abernathy and Utterback emphasize the
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importance of a "dominant product design" in the transition from what we
shall call discrete technology development to innovations motivated by
learning-by-doing. Products such as the DC-3 or the Model T Ford are
seen as examples of dominant product designs. These designs serve as
paradigms for future innovations, and such improvements will consist of
minor refinements until the time when a new discrete technology is
produced and is able to supersede it as a dominant product design. It
should be noted that what may be perceived as a discrete technology
development for a particular step in the production process, may well be
considered a minor process improvement for the total product.
In the simple model developed by David, discrete technology
developments will usually come about only through substantial changes in
factor prices. The reason is that historical choices among techniques
constrain the direction of future technical choices. This can be seen
from Figure A.2. Localized changes induced by learning-by-doing are
perceived by David to take the form of "persisting advance toward the
origin along a specific process-ray (which) plays a quite crucial role in
explaining how factor-prices may govern the long-run bias of technology
progress." (p. 65.) In Figure A.2 we see how relative price changes
from p to p' will "bring an incidental, myopic exploration of the
6 ray. But as learning proceeds the power of price variations to halt
the emerging labor-saving drift of the APF begins to diminish" (David, p.
66). Only a "dramatic alteration of input prices" would restore the
historical bias. That is, even if the relative price changes back to p,
the ray remains the most economic process (as the intersection of the
dotted iso-cost line and APF' indicate in the figure). David goes on to
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characterize the process of technical change induced by learning-by-doing
as a stochastic, Markov process. This is clearly unsatisfactory for our
purposes. But the David model does yield important lessons for our
analysis:
(1) Significant cost advantages are necessary for discrete changes
in technology to be implemented. Discrete technology developments are
guided by changes in relative factor prices. Not only present factor
prices but also expectations about future prices, and thereby future
shifts in demands, will initiate a search for discrete technology
improvements.
(2) The achievement of learning effects is not consistent with the
simultaneous achievement of discrete technology improvements. As David
shows, and as emphasized by Abernathy and Utterback, and by Abernathy and
Wayne, the achievement of a dominant product design in a production unit,
with constant relative prices, can lead to substantial long-run learning
effects, reducing the desirability of level of investment in, and ability
to make discrete technological changes.
(3) The succession of minor process refinements associated with
learning-by-doing will bias the direction of technical advances, and the
availability of options in the future. Once a dominant design has been
developed extensively through a historical evolutionary process only
drastic changes in factor prices or important performance characteristics
will permit the dominant product design to be superseded.
The last point is particularly important; some of the implications
of the localized nature of technical change for a normative theory of
development have been given by Atkinson and Stiglitz. The implication is
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Localized Learning and the
Global Bias of Technological Progress
(David, p.66)
.#
clear: history is important in the technology development process. Even
a casual examination of particular examples will illustrate its
operation. Due to changes in relative prices (and supplies) of energy,
research and development are taking place on alternative automotive power
plants. But the fact is that there are substantial obstacles, both with
respect to costs and with respect to performance in supplanting the
present internal combustion engine with any of the available
alternatives. The initial choice of the internal combustion engine for
powering automobiles serves to restrict present choices, since learning
effects and a succession of minor process and product improvements in the
development of the internal combustion engine have already taken place.
These same learning effects have had limited impact on alternative
technologies (Linden, et al.)
The model described helps us understand how factor price changes and
how expectations about future prices and future demand may affect the
direction of the technology development process. Experience with
production techniques also signals avenues for technology improvements
and thereby causes a more localized, evolutionary form of technical
change. But a major part of technology improvements is not explained
with the above model. This results from the fact that the David model
assumes a homogenous commodity. As soon as we are considering a good
which can be differentiated, technological developments may come about
from a perceived demand for a differentiated product. According to
Abernathy and Utterback, this is the principal means by which radical
product changes come to be implemented. Generally, these major technical
changes may be at a cost disadvantage since they have not been able to
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get the type of cost reduction which may come about from
learning-by-doing. But if the performance characteristics of the
product, or any other differentiating factor, is sufficient to counteract
any initial cost disadvantages, then the product will be developed and
introduced.
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